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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

As in years past,1 important rulings in international criminal
law (ICL) abound in quantities that render it difficult for even the
most avid aficionado to stay current. This is due in part to the fact
that the jurisprudential process remained decentralized in 2008,
with three international/hybrid tribunals actively prosecuting cases
and issuing appeals, two tribunals in pre-trial proceedings, and one
tribunal still largely on the drawing board.2 Pursuant to their
Security Council-mandated Completion Strategies,3 the original ad
hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY)4 and Rwanda (ICTR)5 are gradually winding down their
*

Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. Thanks are
due to all the participants in the Atrocities Crimes Year-In-Review Conference
at Northwestern School of Law for their insightful comments and to Prof. David
Scheffer for including me in such an amazing gathering. In addition, I am
indebted to Adam Birnbaum and Akilah Davis for their excellent research
assistance and to Abby Bernardini for editorial and research assistance.
1
See William A. Schabas, International Criminal Tribunals: A Review of 2007,
6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 382 (2008), available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n3/2/Schabas.pdf.
2
In addition, cases continue to proceed in domestic courts pursuant to
extraterritorial forms of jurisdiction. In 2008, for example, the United States
completed its prosecution against Chuckie Taylor, the son of Liberian exPresident Charles Taylor. Taylor fils was indicted for torture and conspiracy to
commit torture under the U.S. Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2004). See
United States v. Charles Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-CR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48510 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2007) (upholding the constitutionality of the statute). A
jury convicted Taylor in early 2009 and sentenced him to 97 years in prison.
3
See S.C. Res. 1053, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1053 (Apr. 23, 1996); S.C. Res. 1534,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
4
Two individuals indicted by the ICTY continue to elude arrest: Ratko Mladić
and Goran Hadžić. In 2008, the ICTY finally obtained custody of Radovan
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dockets by issuing final trial and appeals judgments. Pursuant to
Rule 11bis, the ICTY is transferring lower-level defendants to
domestic courts for prosecution;6 the ICTR’s efforts to transfer
such cases have fared less well.7 The Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL) is also close to the end of its life, having issued
judgments in all cases pending before it8 except the Charles Taylor
Karadžić, who was arrested in Belgrade on July 21, 2008. Karadžić’s efforts to
represent himself like his brethren Vojislav Šešelj and the late Slobodan
Milošević prompted the ICTY to adopt Rule 45ter, which allows the Tribunal to
assign counsel to an accused “in the interest of justice.” See generally, Michael
P. Scharf & Christopher M. Rassi, Do Former Leaders Have an International
Right to Self-Representation in War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 3 (2005). On September 22, 2008, the Prosecutor submitted an amended
indictment against Karadžić more clearly charging his participation in four
separate joint criminal enterprises related to four distinct crime bases (crimes
committed in Bosnian-Serb controlled territory, the 1992-95 attack on Sarajevo,
the Srebrenica massacre, and the taking of hostages in 1995). The Prosecutor
also dropped the grave breaches count and added two distinct counts of
genocide, among other changes. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18PT, Motion to Amend the First Amended Indictment (Sept. 22, 2008). In
February 2009, the Prosecutor filed a Third Amended Indictment. Prosecutor v.
Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Third Amended Indictment (Feb. 27, 2009).
5
Thirteen ICTR defendants remain at large. See Int’l Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Status of Cases, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last visited June 2,
2009).
6
The cases against Paško Ljubičić, Zeljko Mejakić, and Mitar Rašević provide
examples.
7
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on
the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis (Oct.
8, 2008). The Prosecutor sought the transfer of the case against Munyakazi—a
businessman and leader of a Hutu militia indicted by the ICTR for genocide and
crimes against humanity—to Rwanda pursuant to Rule 11bis. In 2008, the
Appeals Chamber confirmed a Trial Chamber decision to deny the transfer on
the grounds that the implementation of life imprisonment in Rwanda in certain
cases amounted to a life sentence spent in total isolation, id. ¶ 20, and that
Rwanda could not guarantee the safety of witnesses, id. ¶¶ 37-39. The Appeals
Chamber did note, however, that Rwanda had reformed many of the other legal
impediments to transfer by, for example, abolishing the death penalty and
improving judicial independence. Id. ¶¶ 26-31. A similar impasse has arisen for
individuals acquitted by the ICTR who fear a return to Rwanda. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A28 (May 15, 2008) (deciding
that a “request note” by the Tribunal to Canada was sufficient to obligate that
country to grant Ntagerura asylum). See generally Kevin Jon Heller, What
Happens to the Acquitted?, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 663 (2008).
8
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment
(February 22, 2008) (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council); Prosecutor v.
Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment (May 28, 2008) (Civil Defense
Forces (CDF)). The Trial Chamber judgment in the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) trial came down in early 2009. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-0415-T, Judgment (Feb. 25, 2009). An appeal is expected.
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case, which proceeds in guest chambers within the International
Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague.9 By the end of 2008, the ICC
itself had issued arrest warrants10 or confirmed the charges11 in all
of the situations under consideration. In 2008, the ICC also
obtained custody of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui12 and Jean Pierre
Bemba Gombo,13 although all the Ugandan (indicted in 2005)14 and
Sudanese defendants (indicted in 2007 and 2009)15 remain at large.
9

The Prosecution rested its case in February 2009. The Defense’s motion for
acquittal was heard April 6, 2009.
10
See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2, Warrant of Arrest
(Aug. 22, 2006). The Ntaganda warrant for arrest was issued under seal in 2006,
but was not publicly revealed until approximately April 28, 2008.
11
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges (Sept. 30, 2008).
12
The Court unsealed Chui’s arrest warrant on February 7, 2008, the same day
he was arrested and transferred to The Hague. See Prosecutor v. Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07-260, Mandat D’Arrêt a l’Encontre de Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui
[Warrant for Arrest for Mathieu Ngujdjolo Chui] (July 6, 2007).
13
Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-15, Warrant of Arrest for
Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo Replacing the Warrant of Arrest Issued on 23 May
2008 (June 10, 2008). Bemba was arrested by Belgian authorities on May 24,
2008 and transferred to The Hague on July 3, 2008.
14
Pre-Trial Chamber II on October 21 requested the Democratic Republic of
Congo to provide the Chamber with information on measures taken for the
execution of the warrants of arrest issued against the four defendants. See Coal.
of the Int’l Criminal Court, Bulletin No. 7, Sept./Oct. 2008,
www.iccnow.org/documents/Bulletin_no7.pdf (last visited June 2, 2009)
[hereinafter ICC Bulletin No. 7]. The President of the U.N. Security Council
also reminded the international community of the outstanding indictments,
Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. No.
S/PRST/2008/38 (Oct. 21, 2008), and the European Parliament called for arrests,
see European Parliament Resolution of 21 October on the Indictment and
Bringing to Trial of Joseph Kony at the International Criminal Court (Oct. 21,
2008), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+MOTION+B6-2008-0536+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
In
addition, the judges have been evaluating whether the Ugandan cases are still
viable in light of the proposed establishment by Uganda of a special court to
prosecute crimes committed in connection with the Lord’s Resistance Army
campaign. See ICC Bulletin No. 7, supra.
15
In 2008, the ICC Prosecutor applied for a warrant of arrest for President Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir of Sudan, making him the fourth sitting head of state
(along with Charles Taylor (SCSL), Slobodan Milošević (ICTY), and Jean
Kambanda (ICTR)) to be indicted by a modern international tribunal. The Court
issued the warrant, which contains war crimes and crimes against humanity
charges, in March 2009. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (March 4, 2009). In
addition, on November 20, 2008, the Prosecutor presented evidence to the PreTrial Chamber against rebel commanders for crimes committed against African
Union Peacekeepers. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC,
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The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
were largely preoccupied by pre-trial rulings on provision
detention16 and victims’ participation in 200817 and continue to
face corruption allegations.18 They are also considering an
unprecedented appeal by the Canadian Co-Prosecutor to expand
the scope of his investigation contrary to the views of his
Cambodian counterpart.19 In 2008, the Special Court for Lebanon
“Attacks on Peacekeepers Will Not Be Tolerated”. ICC Prosecutor Presents
Evidence in Third Case in Darfur, ICC-OTP-20081120-PR373_ENG (Nov. 20,
2008),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations
and
cases/situations/situation icc 0205/press releases/“attacks on peacekeepers will
not be tolerated”_ icc prosecutor presents evidence in third case in d. See also
Coal. for the Int’l Criminal Court, Darfur: ICC Prosecutor Asks Judges to Open
Third
Case
in
Darfur
(Nov.
20,
2008),
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=3188 (last visited June 3,
2009).
16
See, e.g., Nuon Chea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Order on
Extension of Provisional Detention (Sept. 16, 2008) (extending the detention of
Nuon Chea on the ground that there remain well-founded reasons to believe that
the defendant committed the crimes as charged). Internal Rule 63 allows persons
charged with crimes to be detained provisionally for an initial one-year period,
which may be twice extended. ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 63(6)-(7) (March 6,
2009),
available
at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/121/IRv3-EN.pdf.
In
mandating provisional detention, the Co-Investigating Judges must determine
that the measure is necessary to prevent the defendant from pressuring
witnesses, to preserve evidence, to ensure the presence of the accused, to protect
the security of the individual, or to preserve public order. Id. at Rule 63(3)(b).
The ECCC’s practice of default pre-trial detention has been criticized. See Anne
Heindel, Detention and the Well-Reasoned Opinion, Nov. 15, 2008,
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2008/11/detention-extension-well-reasoned.html
(last visited June 2, 2009).
17
See, e.g., Nuon Chea, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Decision on
Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals, ¶ 36 (Mar. 20, 2008)
(allowing civil parties in the Nuon Chea case to participate in provisional
detention appeals).
18
See Seth Mydans, Corruption Allegations Affect Khmer Rouge Trials, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
10,
2009,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/10/world/asia/10cambo.html?_r=1&ref=globa
l-home.
19
At the end of 2008, the ECCC had five individuals in custody: four regime
leaders and one prison head. See Beth Van Schaack, Who Next?, Dec. 4, 2008,
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/index.php?option=com_myblog&show=WhoNext-.html&Itemid=55 (last visited June 3, 2009). The decision of whether to
pursue additional defendants rests with the Tribunal’s two Co-Prosecutors, who
are in disagreement on this point. According to the ECCC’s constitutive statute,
if such disputes cannot be resolved internally, they are to be referred to a PreTrial Chamber (PTC) of judges for decision. The investigations will go forward
unless the PTC rules by supermajority (in an opinion that at least one
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(SCL) gradually began to take shape.20 The year 2009 promises
additional institutional flux, as the ad hocs continue to close down,
the ECCC and SCL gear up, and the ICC begins its first trials. Also
on the horizon is the first ICC review conference (to be held in
Uganda in 2010), where delegates will focus on reaching a
consensus definition for the crime of aggression.21
This survey of 2008’s top developments in these international
fora will focus on the law governing international crimes and
applicable forms of responsibility. Several trends in the law are
immediately apparent. The tribunals continue to delineate and
clarify the interfaces between the various international crimes,
particularly war crimes and crimes against humanity, which may
be committed simultaneously or in parallel with each other.
Several important cases went to judgment in 2008 that address war
crimes drawn from the Hague tradition of international
humanitarian law, and the international courts are demonstrating a
greater facility for adjudicating highly technical aspects of this
body of law. In addition, there were several cases with immediate
relevance to the “war on terror” proceedings in the United States
that have addressed such thorny issues as when acts of terrorism
international judge must join) that they should not. See Law on the
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,
art. 20 new, NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR Law as amended 27 Oct 2004 Eng.pdf
. The Cambodian Co-Prosecutor, Chea Leang, is opposed to additional
investigations on account of “(1) Cambodia’s past instability and the continued
need for national reconciliation, (2) the spirit of the agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Cambodia . . . and the spirit of the law
that established this court (“ECCC Law”), and (3) the limited duration and
budget of this court.” Statement of Co-Prosecutors (Jan. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/press/84/Statement_OCP_05-0109_EN.pdf.
20
See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007); Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/lebanon/tribunal/index.shtml
(last visited June 24, 2009).
21
See Coal. for the Int’l Criminal Court, Review Conference of the Rome
Statute, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=review (last visited June 3, 2009). The
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression concluded its work at the
7th Session of the Assembly of State Parties in early 2009. An informal
intersessional session on the crime convened in June 2009. For a recent
discussion paper on the crime of aggression, see Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly
of State Parties, Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression Proposed by the
Chairman, ICC-ASP/7/WGCA/INF.1 (Feb. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ICC-ASP-7-SWGCAINF.1%20English.pdf.
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contribute to triggering IHL, what conduct constitutes direct
participation in hostilities, and when acts of terrorism may
constitute war crimes within the jurisdiction of ICL tribunals.
While the year produced some groundbreaking jurisprudence on
gender-based and sexual violence—in particular, the confirmation
of the international crime of forced marriage—the year continued
to feature setbacks in ensuring that such crimes are consistently
and rigorously prosecuted.22 The forms of responsibility in ICL
continue to undergo significant development and refinement, and
the ICC is beginning to explore the scope of Article 25 of its
Statute, which sets out the Court’s applicable forms of
responsibility. While the Court will no doubt be influenced by the
jurisprudence of its ad hoc predecessors, it is clear from early
jurisprudence that its personnel are intent on charting their own
course.
A general observation from the developments in 2008: the
rate of innovation in substantive ICL is slowing considerably. Like
many incipient areas of law, the progress of ICL development
since its renaissance in the 1990s proceeded in great leaps, with
early cases addressing vast open areas of legal doctrine. In this
process, the judges on the international criminal tribunals engaged
in a full-scale—if unacknowledged—refashioning of ICL through
their jurisprudence by updating and expanding historical treaties,
even at the expense of fealty to negotiated compromises; by more
precisely identifying the elements of international crimes, forms of
responsibility, defenses, and other penal doctrines; and by adding
content to customary international law concepts and vaguelyworded treaty provisions that were conceived more as retrospective
condemnations of past horrors than as detailed codes for
prospective penal enforcement. Today’s decisions, by contrast, are
increasingly applying established law to novel facts. ICL has thus
begun to exhibit features of a more mature body of law with
modern innovations happening primarily at the outer edges of
doctrine. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin has employed a
tree metaphor to describe this process,23 whereby jurisprudence of
22

For a discussion of the legacy of gender justice before the ad hoc international
tribunals, see Beth Van Schaack, Obstacles On The Road To Gender Justice:
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda As Object Lesson, 17 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 355 (2009).
23
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 70 (1986).
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the likes of Tadić24 and Akayesu25 provided the trunk for modern
ICL, whereas decisions in the more recent cases, perched on ever
narrower branches, are making increasingly nuanced refinements
to established doctrine. As in the domestic historical narrative—by
which account legislative primacy eventually supplanted the
common law crime—international crimes are increasingly finding
expression in more positivistic sources of law, thus obviating the
need for, and diminishing the discretion of, international judges to
make law in the face of gaps or deficiencies. As a result, there has
been less and less space for judges to build upon the ICL edifice,
and the defense of nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without
law”)—once ubiquitous in the early cases—has retreated in
significance.26
II. THE YEAR IN JUDGMENTS
A. The Concept of Gravity in International Criminal Law
¶4

Although there may be fewer blockbuster rulings in 2008
than in years past, the ICL jurisprudence of the past year has
featured several important yet subtle developments. Of overarching
importance, the Court made public in 2008 a 2006 opinion in
which it began to operationalize the concept of gravity within the
ICC Statute.27 One of the primary justifications for the
international or extraterritorial prosecution of international crimes
is that grave crimes should not go unpunished.28 The ICL tribunals
are specifically charged in their founding documents with
concentrating on the most serious crimes of international concern29
24

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR92, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995).
25
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-94-4-T, Judgement (Dec. 6, 1999).
26
For a fuller discussion of this process vis-à-vis the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege see Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the
Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119 (2008).
27
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58, ¶ 44 (Feb. 10,
2006) [hereinafter Lubanga Arrest Warrant Decision], available at
http://145.7.218.139/iccdocs/doc/doc236260.PDF.
28
For a comprehensive discussion of the way in which the concept of gravity
undergirds the legal, moral, and sociological legitimacy of the International
Criminal Court, see Margaret M. DeGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the
International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400 (2009).
29
The ICTR, for example, is dedicated to prosecuting “persons responsible for
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or upon high-level defendants who are most responsible for the
commission of international crimes.30 The concept of gravity
permeates the ICC Statute as an express limitation on the Court’s
jurisdiction and as a guide to the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. According to Article 5(1), for example, the “jurisdiction
of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole.”31 The prosecutor’s
decisions (1) to initiate an investigation into a situation and then
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the Territory
of Rwanda.” Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 1,
Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602 (emphasis added) [hereinafter ICTR Statute],
available at http://www.un.org/ictr/statute.html. Similar language appears in the
Statute of the ICTY at Article 1. Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia art. 1, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY
Statute],
available
at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal
Library/Statute/statute_sept08_en.pdf. In addition, the ICTR Statute empowers
that tribunal to prosecute “persons committing or ordering to be committed
serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949.” ICTR Statute, supra, art. 4 (emphasis added). Accord Statute of the
Special Court of Sierra Leone art. 3, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138
[hereinafter
SCSL
Statute],
available
at
http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtStatuteFinal.pdf.
30
The Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia are to “bring to trial
senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea [the Khmer Rouge] and those who
were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal
law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions
recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April
1975 to 6 January 1979.” Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 1, Oct. 27, 2004,
NS/RKM/1004/006
[hereinafter
ECCC
Statute],
available
at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2
004_Eng.pdf. Likewise, the Special Court for Sierra Leone is to concentrate on
“persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the
territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.” Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/2002/246/Annex (Jan. 16,
2002),
available
at
http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtAgreementFinal.pdf .
31
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(1), opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. See also id.
art. 1 (providing that the Court has “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern”). Some of the
crimes themselves contain gravity thresholds. See, e.g., id. art. 6(b) (setting forth
genocide actus reus of “causing serious bodily or mental harm” to members of a
protected group); art. 7(1)(e) (including as a crime against humanity “severe
deprivation[s] of physical liberty”); art. 7(g) (same with respect to “other
form[s] of sexual violence of comparable gravity” to rape, sexual slavery, etc.).
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(2) to commence a prosecution against a specific individual are
premised in part on a determination of a case’s admissibility under
Article 17.32 Article 17(1), in turn, invokes the concept of gravity
and provides that a case33 will be considered inadmissible if it “is
not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.” In
addition, pursuant to Article 53, the prosecutor may decline to
initiate either an investigation or prosecution where there are
“substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not
serve the interests of justice,” taking into account the gravity of the
crime and the interests of the victims.34 Decisions to decline to
initiate either an investigation or a prosecution are subject to some
32

Id. art. 53(1)(b) (concerning the initiation of an investigation); art. 53(2)(b)
(concerning the initiation of a prosecution).
33
These Articles address gravity with respect to “cases” (which presumes the
commission of a particular crime by a particular defendant) and not to the
antecedent determination of which “situations” to investigate. In the Lubanga
case, however, a Pre-Trial Chamber determined that the gravity threshold in
Article 17 applies to both situations and cases. Lubanga, Arrest Warrant
Decision, ¶ 44 (“The gravity threshold provided for in article 17(1)(d) of the
Statute must be applied at two different stages: (i) at the stage of initiation of the
investigation of a situation, the relevant situation must meet such a gravity
threshold; and (ii) once a case arises from the investigation of a situation, it must
also meet the gravity threshold provided for in that provision.”). Indeed, the
Office of the Prosecutor indicated that it would select situations to investigate in
accordance with the Article 53 criteria. ICC Office of the Prosecutor,
Communication Concerning the Situation in Iraq, at 8 (Feb. 9, 2006), available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/04D143C8-19FB-466C-AB774CDB2FDEBEF7/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pd
f. See Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute, available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1270369, in FUTURE
DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Carsten Stahn and Larissa
van den Herik, eds., TMC Asser/CUP, 2009) (presuming that the principles
governing situational gravity are not substantially different from those
governing case gravity). Parts of the Lubanga Arrest Warrant Decision were
overturned upon appeal; this aspect of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s opinion
remained intact. It should be noted, however, that aspects of the Appeals
Chambers’ opinion (such as the elimination of an admissibility inquiry at the
arrest warrant stage and the de-emphasis on the systematicity and large scale
nature of the crimes) could be interpreted to diminish the relevance of situational
gravity. See infra text accompanying notes 51-54.
34
ICC Statute, supra note 31, arts. 53(1)(c) (concerning the initiation of an
investigation), 53(2)(c) (concerning the initiation of a prosecution). See Office
of the Prosecutor, ICC, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, ICC-OTP-2007
(2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D4321-BF09-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf (discussing
the exceptional circumstances in which a situation or case, that would otherwise
qualify for selection by the Prosecutor is not pursued on the ground that it would
not serve the “interests of justice”).
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oversight by the Pre-Trial Chamber. In the case of a referral from
the Security Council or a State Party, the Pre-Trial Chamber can
“request the Prosecutor to reconsider [his or her] decision” not to
proceed if so requested by the source of the referral.35 A decision
by the Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation or
prosecution on the basis of the “interests of justice” (which
includes a consideration of the crime’s gravity and the interests of
victims) is “effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial
Chamber.”36 On the basis of these provisions and prevailing
interpretations thereof, gravity concerns appear relevant before the
ICC at two key moments: when choosing which situations to
investigate and when choosing particular cases (i.e., crimes or
individuals) to investigate and prosecute.
Although crucial investigative decisions are premised upon
an objective assessment of gravity, the Statute provides little in the
way of concrete guidance for elucidating the quantitative or
qualitative contours of this key concept. In a 2006 set of draft
criteria for the selection of cases and situations that was circulated
for discussion,37 the ICC Prosecutor indicated that in assessing
gravity, he would focus in part on the number of victims of
particularly serious crimes, with reference to the scale of the
crimes and the degree to which they were systematically
committed.38 At the same time, the criteria include more qualitative
factors, such as whether the crimes are planned, are ongoing or
may be repeated, exhibit particular cruelty or reflect other
aggravating circumstances, target especially vulnerable victims,
are discriminatory in their execution, or involve an abuse of
power.39 In addition, the prosecutor announced that he will
35

Id. art. 53(3)(a). The Pre-Trial Chamber may request that the Prosecutor
reconsider his or her decision when the referring state or the Security Council so
demands.
36
Article 53(3)(b). The effect of this provision appears to be that the Pre-Trial
Chamber can order the Prosecutor to investigate a situation. See Heller, supra
note 33, at 31.
37
ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Draft for Discussion: Criteria for Selection of
Situations and Cases, at 4-5 (June 2006) [hereinafter Draft Criteria for
Selection].
38
See ICC Office of the Prosecution, Draft Discussion Paper, The Interests of
Justice: Internal OTP Discussion Paper, at 5 (June 13, 2006) (summarizing
factors for determining whether the situation is of sufficient gravity).
39
Id.; Draft Criteria for Selection, supra note 37. See also International
Federation of Human Rights, Comments on the Office of the Prosecutor’s Draft
Policy Paper on “Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases,” at 1, Sept. 15,
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consider “the broader impact of the crimes on the community and
on regional peace and security, including longer term social,
economic, and environmental damage.”40 By way of example, he
noted that the situations currently under consideration in Central
and East Africa involved thousands of displacements, killings,
abductions, attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian workers,
and large-scale sexual violence.41
The ICC adjudicated these gravity provisions for the first
time in the cases arising out of the ongoing regional war being
waged in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The rulings
emerged in the context of the Prosecutor’s request to the ICC’s
Pre-Trial Chamber for the issuance of arrest warrants against two
defendants: Thomas Dyilo Lubanga (Lubanga) and Bosco
Ntaganda pursuant to Article 58(1) of the ICC Statute.42 In this
matter of first impression, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that it
had to confirm the admissibility of the case prior to issuing any
arrest warrant. In so doing, the Pre-Trial Chamber looked to
several factors. First, the Trial Chamber considered the existence
of systematic or large-scale crimes.43 Second, the Pre-Trial
Chamber indicated that it would look to the “social alarm” caused
within the international community by the relevant conduct.44
Third, the Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that it would consider the
position of the accused and whether he or she fell within the
category of the most senior leaders involved in the situation under
2006,
available
at
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH_comments__selection_criteria_-_final.pdf (approving of this approach and the consideration
of “the impact of the crimes on the affected communities as well as on regional
peace and security”).
40
Draft Criteria for Selection, supra note 37.
41
Id.
42
An arrest warrant is appropriate according to that Article where (a) there “are
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court” and (b) the arrest of the person appears necessary to
guarantee his or her appearance, to ensure that the individual does not endanger
the investigation, or to prevent the commission of additional crimes. ICC
Statute, supra note 31, art. 58(1)(a)-(b).
43
“Systematicity” can be interpreted to mean crimes that follow a pattern, are
organized, or are being committed pursuant to a policy or plan. It seems clear
that “systematic” conduct need not be pursuant to a plan, policy, common
design, or conspiracy if it is a regular or repeated feature of an armed conflict or
state of repression that arises naturally without exogenous impetus. The notion
of “large-scale” denotes a quantitative measure and suggests that the crimes are
numerous or widespread.
44
Lubanga Arrest Warrant Decision, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ¶¶ 46-47.
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investigation, taking into account the role of the suspect in the state
or organization implicated in the abuses.45 The Chamber reasoned
that this latter factor would maximize the deterrent effect of the
Court by focusing on those individuals most capable of preventing
the commission of international crimes.46 Although the Pre-Trial
Chamber issued the arrest warrant for Lubanga,47 it determined that
Ntaganda was not a central figure in the decision-making process
of the Union of Congolese Patriots and lacked any authority over
the development or implementation of policies and practices (such
as the negotiation of peace agreements).48 This was
notwithstanding the fact that Ntaganda was in a command position
over sector commanders and field officers.49 On the basis of these
factors, the case against Ntaganda was deemed inadmissible, and
the arrest warrant did not issue.
The Prosecutor appealed this decision, arguing that the PreTrial Chamber committed an error of law in defining gravity too
narrowly for the purpose of determining the admissibility of the
case against Ntaganda. The Appeals Chamber ruled50 as a
preliminary matter that an admissibility determination was not a
45

Id. ¶¶ 52-53, 64. Had this criterion remained operative, it would have
effectively precluded the pyramidal prosecutorial strategy employed by many
domestic prosecutors and before the ICTY. See Carla Del Ponte, Investigation
and Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes at the International Level, 4 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 539, 543 (2006) (noting the practice of building “a case against the
most senior persons responsible [with] a series of cases which ‘work up the
ladder,’ prosecuting lower-level perpetrators in the collection of evidence
against the higher-level perpetrators”).
46
Lubanga Arrest Warrant Decision, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ¶¶ 49, 55.
47
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest (Feb.
10, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc191959.PDF. At
the time the warrant issued, Lubanga had been in the custody of Congolese
authorities, who transferred him to the ICC on March 17, 2006, making him the
first defendant in the custody of the ICC. His trial commenced in January 2009.
48
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, ¶ 87 (Feb. 10, 2006),
available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc530350.PDF.
49
Id. ¶ 85.
50
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgement on the
Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled
“Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58”
(July 13, 2006). (Although this decision is dated 2006, it was reclassified as
public in April 2008 when the Court unsealed the arrest warrant against
Ntaganda. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision to
Unseal the Warrant of Arrest Against Bosco Ntaganda (April 28, 2008),
available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc479828.PDF).
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pre-requisite to the issuance of an arrest warrant.51 Turning to the
issue of gravity, the Appeals Chamber determined that the PreTrial Chamber had erred in its interpretation of gravity in several
key respects. First, it noted that imposing requirements of
systematicity or large-scale action contradicted the guiding
threshold language of Article 8(1) governing war crimes, which
provides for jurisdiction only “in particular” when war crimes are
committed “as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes” and duplicated aspects of the
definition of crimes against humanity that already require a
showing that the charged acts were part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population.52 Second, the
Appeals Chamber also took issue with the concept of “social
alarm,” which it noted depends on “subjective and contingent
reactions” to crimes “rather than upon their objective gravity.”53
Finally, the Appeals Chamber noted that the deterrent effect
of the Court will be maximized where all categories of perpetrator
may be brought before the Court.54 It reasoned that “individuals
who are not at the very top of an organization may still carry
considerable influence and commit, or generate the widespread
commission of, very serious crimes.”55 In so ruling, the Appeals
Chamber appropriately refocused the gravity inquiry on qualitative
rather than quantitative factors, ensuring flexibility in pursuing
cases and enhancing the deterrent power of the Court. The Court
thus reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s finding of inadmissibility
and remanded the case to determine on the basis of Article 58(1)
alone whether an arrest warrant against Ntaganda should be
issued.56 The Pre-Trial Chamber subsequently issued an arrest
warrant against Ntaganda (unsealed April 28, 2008) charging him

51

Id. ¶ 41. In particular, the Court ruled that Article 58 contains an exhaustive
list of factors to consider in issuing a warrant for arrest such that admissibility
should not be treated as an additional substantive pre-requisite. Id. ¶ 42. In
addition, the Court noted that admissibility determinations should involve the
accused, which is impossible where they are undertaken in advance of the
issuance of an arrest warrant. Id. ¶ 50.
52
Id. ¶ 70.
53
Id. ¶ 72.
54
Id. ¶¶ 73-75.
55
Id. ¶ 77.
56
Id. ¶ 91.
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alongside Lubanga with enlisting, conscripting and using child
soldiers in armed conflict.57 Ntaganda remains at large.
B. War Crimes
¶9

One set of 2008 cases worth highlighting concerns those war
crimes that trace their origins to the Hague tradition of
international humanitarian law (IHL), concerning the means and
methods of warfare, as opposed to the Geneva tradition, primarily
concerning particular classes of protected person.58 Early cases
before the ICTY in particular tended to focus on Geneva crimes
(such as the mistreatment or murder of civilians or prisoners of war
in detention).59 Later ICTY cases have addressed the at times more
technical Hague crimes, premised on breaches of the fundamental
and interlocking principles of military necessity, proportionality,
and distinction.60 Some of the first cases addressed to the means
and methods of warfare were relatively thin in their reasoning.61 In
57

Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest (Aug.
22, 2006) (reclassified as public on April 28, 2008).
58
Additional novel war crimes rulings are found in the Civil Defense Forces
(CDF) case before the SCSL. There, defendants were convicted of engaging in
collective punishments (imposing collective punishment upon persons for acts
or omissions that they did not personally commit) against the civilian population
in violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II, punishable under Article 3(b) of the SCSL Statute. Prosecutor v.
Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 176-181, 697, 728, 740, 759762 (Aug. 2, 2007). On appeal, the Appeals Chamber noted that “punishment”
must be considered distinct from other forms targeting of protected persons,
which may not “necessarily be predicated upon a perceived transgression by
such persons.” Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 223
(May 28, 2008). Although the Appeals Chamber confirmed that cumulative
convictions could be entered for acts of murder, pillage, and cruel treatment
along with the imposition of collective punishments, id. ¶ 225, it nonetheless
reversed the convictions on the ground that the required mens rea of the offense
(the intent to collectively punish rather than target) was not met, id. ¶ 130. In the
same opinion, the Appeals Chamber issued a useful ruling on the crime of
pillage, which requires the unlawful appropriation of property, as distinct from
the crime of causing destruction not justified by military necessity. Id. ¶ 409.
59
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement (Feb, 20,
2001) (adjudicating crimes committed against detained civilians).
60
A use of military force may only target military objectives whose destruction
offers a definite military advantage, and it may only involve a level of force that
is proportional to the concrete military advantage to be gained. See Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48-52,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
61
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 159-187
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more recent cases, including some opinions released in 2008,62 the
ICTY had demonstrated a much greater facility with these norms.
Several of these cases—e.g., Boškoski and Strugar—also address
issues that are of direct and immediate relevance to ongoing
proceedings involving individuals detained by the United States as
part of the so-called “war on terror,” such as the scope of
application of IHL, the definition of combatant, the challenges of
conflict classification, and the notion of direct participation in
hostilities.63 These opinions provide a window into the ability of
international judges to adjudicate war crimes—the crime within the
jurisdiction of the ICC that raises the most concern to the United
States and other strong military powers that have failed to join the
Court to date.
1. Hague Crimes
¶10

One such example is the Appeals Chamber’s decision in
Martić.64 Milan Martić held various leadership positions in the
Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, a Serbian-majority area
within Bosnia-Herzegovina whose populace pursued irredentist
aspirations during the war in the former Yugoslavia. In the period
covered by the indictment (1991-1995), Martić was Minister of the
Interior and of Defense, Deputy Commander of the Territorial
Defense Forces, and eventually President of the so-called Republic
of Serbian Krajina. The Tribunal originally indicted him in a fourcount indictment for his in role shelling the Croatian city of Zagreb
on May 2 and 3, 1995.65 In 2002 and 2005, the prosecutor amended
this indictment to charge Martić with more extensive involvement
in a joint criminal enterprise to establish an ethnically-Serb
territory through the displacement of non-Serb inhabitants.66
(Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkić, Case No. IT-95-14/2,
Judgement ¶¶ 358-62, 803-09 (Feb. 26, 2001).
62
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgement (Oct. 8,
2008) [hereinafter Martić Appeal Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No.
IT-01-42-A, Judgement (July 17, 2008) [hereinafter Strugar Appeal Judgement].
63
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T (July 10, 2008);
Strugar Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-01-42-A.
64
Martić Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-95-11-A.
65
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-96-11, Indictment (July 25, 1995) (charging
Martić with unlawful attacks against the civilian population).
66
See Prosecutor v. Martić, Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-95-11-PT (Dec.
9, 2005) (charging various crimes against humanity and war crimes as part of a
joint criminal enterprise and pursuant to the doctrine of superior responsibility).
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In 2006, the Trial Chamber convicted the defendant of
various crimes against humanity and war crimes, including the
original charges of ordering the 1995 shelling of Zagreb, which
was characterized as both a war crime (encompassing the crimes of
murder, cruel treatment, and attacking civilians) and a crime
against humanity (including murder and inhumane acts).67 With
respect to the Zagreb attack, the Trial Chamber found that the use
of twelve M-87 Orkan rockets (Yugoslav-manufactured, nonguided, high-dispersion missiles containing cluster bomb
warheads)68 in Zagreb constituted a widespread attack against the
civilian population.69 In particular, it held that given the
indiscriminate character of the weapon, especially at the range at
which it was fired,70 its use in a densely populated area constituted
a per se indiscriminate attack, notwithstanding the presence of any
lawful military targets.71 The Chamber also rejected Martić’s
argument that the attack could be justified as a reprisal.72 The
67

Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement (June 12, 2007)
[hereinafter Martić Trial Judgement].
68
The Trial Chamber found that the cluster bombs fired on Zagreb each
contained 288 bomblets containing 420 balls. At a height of 800-1,000m above
the targeted area, the rocket ejects the bomblets, which explode upon impact,
releasing the pellets. The maximum firing range of the M-87 Orkan is 50
kilometers, and the dispersion error (i.e., the distance from the point of impact to
the mean point of impact) increases with the firing range. Id. ¶ 462.
69
Id. ¶¶ 462-63, 469.
70
Id. ¶ 463. Expert testimony adduced by the prosecutor indicated that when
fired from a range of 50 km, the dispersion error of the Orkan is about 1000m in
each direction. The prosecution submitted the testimony of two expert
witnesses: Lieutenant Colonel Jožef Poje, a former officer in the Yugoslavia
national army (JNA) and an artillery expert, and Reynaud Theunens, an
investigator with the ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor, who authored an expert
report on the evolution of the Yugoslavia national army. The defendant had
earlier unsuccessfully excluded the testimony of Theunens on grounds of
impartiality. See Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Decision on
Defence’s Motion to Exclude the Evidence of Reynaud Theunens and to Call an
Independent Military Expert with Confidential Annexes A, B, C, D and E (Nov.
28, 2006).
71
Martić Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-95-11-T, ¶ 461.
72
Id. ¶ 468. A reprisal is “an otherwise unlawful act rendered lawful by the fact
that it is made in response to a violation of international humanitarian law by
another belligerent.” Martić Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ¶ 263.
Reprisals are subject to strict conditions: they are only to be used as an
exceptional measure of last resort when other options to provoke compliance
have been exhausted, they must be proportional, and they must be preceded by a
warning. See Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 535
(Jan. 14, 2000).
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ICTY convicted Martić for killing seven individuals (including a
Croatian police officer who died while deactivating a bomb) and
wounding over 200.73
¶12
On appeal, the defendant challenged all these findings,
arguing that the shelling of Zagreb was a lawful military action
involving military targets and undertaken in self-defense with
precise—rather than indiscriminate—weapons. He further argued
that the Chamber had erred in accepting the opinions of the
Prosecution’s expert witnesses whose information, in his
estimation, was outdated.74 In the alternative, Martić claimed that
he did not have the military knowledge to evaluate the impact of
the particular rocket employed, and in any case was not in charge
of weapons selection during the offensive. Finally, he pointed the
finger at Croatia, arguing that its officials failed to take the
necessary precautions to protect the civilian population from the
attack as required by Article 58 of Additional Protocol I.75 The
Appeals Chamber largely affirmed the Trial Chamber’s findings,76
determining that Martić knew about the effects of the M-87 Orkan
when he ordered the shelling of Zagreb.77 It also confirmed that the
attack could not be characterized as a lawful reprisal or an exercise
in self-defense.78
2. Direct Participation in Hostilities
¶13

The Strugar case also involved allegations that the defendant
adopted improper means and methods of warfare. The Prosecution
charged General Pavle Strugar, the commander of a unit of the
73

Martić Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-95-11-T, ¶ 470.
Martić Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ¶ 239.
75
Id. ¶¶ 240, 244. That Article provides that
74

76

The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible:
(a) Without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to
remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects
under their control from the vicinity of military objectives;
(b) Avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated
areas;
(c) Take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the
dangers resulting from military operations.
Geneva Convention Protocol I, supra note 60, art. 58.

Martić Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ¶¶ 249-252, 259-261.
Id. ¶ 256.
78
Id. ¶¶ 264-268.
77
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Yugoslav National Army (JNA), with superior responsibility for an
unlawful attack on civilians and civilian objects in the Old Town
of Dubrovnik. The attack involved the use of mortars (a muzzleloading weapon that fires shells at relatively short ranges),
recoilless guns (which facilitate the firing of a heavy projectile),
and wire-guided rockets (a projectile guided by signals sent to it
via thin wires connected to the missile and its guidance
mechanism), which destroyed cultural property and caused civilian
deaths and injuries. After it declared the defendant fit to stand
trial79 and conducted a site visit, the Trial Chamber convicted
Strugar of unlawful attacks on civilians and cultural property80 and
sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment.81 Although the Trial
Chamber was not satisfied either that Strugar ordered the attack or
that he was aware of the substantial likelihood that such an attack
would occur as a result of his order to attack Croatian forces
located above the city,82 it nonetheless found him guilty pursuant to
79

Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Decision Re the Defense Motion
to Terminate Proceedings (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter Strugar Fitness
Decision].
80
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶ 478 (Jan. 31, 2005)
[hereinafter Strugar Trial Judgement]. The crimes were identified as
unenumerated offenses under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute with reference to
Article 51 and 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Id. ¶¶
273-83, 298-312. The notion of an unlawful attack encompasses direct,
indiscriminate, and disproportionate attacks. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT01-42-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶¶ 9-11 (Nov. 22, 2002).
Purporting to apply principles of cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber did
not enter convictions for the crimes of murder, cruel treatment, devastation not
justified by military necessity, or unlawful attacks on civilian objects, on the
ground that those crimes were encompassed in the counts on which convictions
were entered. Strugar Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-01-42-T, ¶¶ 447-454. The
prosecution appealed this aspect of the Judgement with respect to the property
crimes, arguing that the Trial Chamber erroneously exercised its discretion to
decline to enter convictions for crimes that contained materially distinct
elements of the charges upheld. The Appeals Chamber agreed, quoting a prior
ruling that “when the evidence supports convictions under multiple counts for
the same underlying acts, the test . . . does not permit the Trial Chamber
discretion to enter one or more of the appropriate convictions, unless the two
crimes do not possess materially distinct elements.” Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case
No. IT-01-42-A, Judgement, ¶ 324 (July. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Strugar Appeal
Judgement] (quoting Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement, ¶
358 (Mar. 22, 2006)). Accordingly, new convictions were entered, although the
sentence was not amended as the new convictions were based on the same
criminal conduct. Id. ¶¶ 332, 388.
81
Strugar Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-01-42-T, ¶¶ 478, 481.
82
Id. ¶¶ 347, 358.
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the principle of superior responsibility on the grounds that he
exercised effective control over the responsible forces, knew that
the attack was occurring or might occur, and failed to either stop it
or conduct an investigation after the fact.83
¶14
On appeal, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the Trial
Chamber’s approach to determining the defendant’s fitness to
stand trial with a review of national and international authorities.84
Among his alleged errors of fact and law, Strugar argued that one
of the individuals injured, a driver for the Dubrovnik Municipal
Crisis Staff who was transporting members of the Crisis Staff to
perform war tasks, was a lawful military target and thus could not
be the victim of the crime of cruel treatment under Article 3 of the
Statute by virtue of being injured during the shelling of the Old
City.85 As grounds, Strugar noted that the victim, a reservist who
had not been called up during the conflict, had been deemed a
“military war invalid” as a result of his injuries.86 The ensuring
opinion is important, because in prior cases, the Tribunal had not
had occasion to fully flush out the concept of direct participation in
hostilities, because the victims were in detention and could no
longer directly participate in hostilities.87 As such, any attack
83

Id. ¶¶ 391, 414, 418, 446.
Strugar Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-01-42-A, ¶¶ 25-64. The Trial
Chamber had determined that an accused is fit to stand trial when, viewed
overall and in a reasonable and commonsense manner, he has the capacity to
plead, to testify, to instruct counsel, and to understand the nature of the charges,
the course of the proceedings, the details of the evidence, and the consequences
of trial. Strugar Fitness Decision, Case No. IT-01-42-T, ¶¶ 36-37.
85
Strugar Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-01-42-A, ¶ 164.
86
Id. ¶ 183.
87
The concept of direct participation in hostilities has been raised in the ICTY
proceedings as a defense to charges that the defendant intentionally attacked
civilians whereby the defendant argues that the individual in question was
directly participating in hostilities, thus abrogating his or her immunity from
attack. In the Guantánamo litigation, by contrast, this concept has been
employed to help identify “enemy combatants,” whom the U.S. government
argued may be indefinitely detained by the U.S. in connection with its military
operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This line of argument thus
controversially applies a targeting doctrine to the detention context. See United
States v. Hamdan, U.S. Military Comm’n, Ruling on Motion to Dismiss for
Lack
of
Jurisdiction,
at
6
(Dec.
19,
2007),
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2007/Hamdan-Jurisdiction
After
Reconsideration Ruling.pdf (last visited June 6, 2009) (finding that the accused
directly participated in hostilities by driving weapons in temporal and spatial
proximity to ongoing combat operations). So far, these international law
opinions have not been cited in the domestic litigation, but cross-fertilization is
84
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against or mistreatment of detained individuals is unlawful,
regardless of the victim’s classification as a civilian or
combatant.88
¶15
The determination of whether a particular victim was directly
participating in hostilities is foundational to many war crimes
charges, as civilians enjoy protection from military operations
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in the
hostilities.89 In Strugar, the Appeals Chamber reiterated the
standard of direct participation in hostilities that had been
employed in previous cases:90 the Prosecution must show beyond a
reasonable doubt that at the time of the injury, the victim was not
inevitable. The International Committee of the Red Cross with the Dutch T.M.C.
Asser Institute has prepared interpretive guidance on the concept of direct
participation for governments. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN
LAW
(2009),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-ihlarticle-020609/$File/direct-participation-guidance-2009-ICRC.pdf.
88
Strugar Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-01-42-A, ¶ 179 n.458, 460.
89
Id. ¶ 174 (citing Article 51(3), Additional Protocol I (“Civilians shall enjoy
the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities.”); Article 43(2), Additional Protocol I). Article 43(2) of
Additional Protocol I provides that “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to
a conflict . . . are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate
directly in hostilities.” Id. Article 13(3) of Protocol II applies the same rule to
non-international armed conflicts that meet that treaty’s material field of
application per Article 1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts art. 13(3), June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex II
[hereinafter Protocol II]. The provisions cited by the ICTY, it should be noted,
technically apply only within the context of an international armed conflict,
where the concepts of combatant and prisoner of war are well-established.
Strugar Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-01-42-A, ¶ 170 n.427. Notably,
because the prosecution had not charged the commission of grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, the Trial Chamber did not have occasion to classify
the particular conflict at issue as international or non-international. Id. ¶ 179
n.458 (“In conflicts where Common Article 3 is the only applicable provision,
the more elaborate rules regarding civilian and combatant status outlined in the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I would not be applicable.”).
Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber assumed that the concepts of “active
participation” in common Article 3 and “direct participation” in Additional
Protocol I are synonymous. Id. ¶ 173. Common Article 3 specifically applies to
“persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat,” and
protects such individuals from “violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.”
90
Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement, ¶ 51
(Dec. 17, 2004).
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committing “acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely
to cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the enemy’s
armed forces.”91 It made clear that direct participation is not
limited to combat activities as such and might include the
commission of other “acts harmful to the adverse party.”92
¶16
Canvassing military manuals, treaty drafting histories, prior
jurisprudence, and other sources of state practice and opinio juris,
the Appeals Chamber identified several types of direct
participation in hostilities that fall short of obviously hostile acts,
such as transmitting military information for immediate use by a
belligerent, transporting weapons in proximity to combat
operations, or serving as a guard or intelligence agent on behalf of
a military force.93 At the same time, it noted that the concept of
direct participation does not embrace all acts in support of a war
effort or all forms of work of a military character. To determine
otherwise would render the principle of distinction virtually
meaningless.94 In this regard, the Appeals Chamber identified
several forms of indirect participation that would not cause a
civilian to forfeit his civilian immunity, including selling goods or
supplying food to parties to the conflict, expressing sympathy for
the cause, failing to act to prevent an incursion by a belligerent
force, gathering and transporting military information, arms,
munitions or other supplies to a party, and providing specialist
advice.95 Ambiguous cases may turn on the degree of nexus
between the victim’s activities at the time of the alleged offense
and contemporaneous acts of war that are intended to cause harm
to the adverse party.96
91

Strugar Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-01-42-A, ¶ 173. See also id. ¶ 175
(noting that “the notion of active participation in hostilities encompasses armed
participation in combat activities”).
92
Id. ¶ 176 (citing Article 67(1)(e), Additional Protocol I; International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries art 3(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989) (referencing
participation in “a concerted act of violence”)).
93
Id. ¶ 177.
94
Id. ¶ 176.
95
Id.
96
Id. (“As the temporal scope of an individual’s participation in hostilities can
be intermittent and discontinuous, whether a victim was actively participating in
the hostilities at the time of the offence depends on the nexus between the
victim’s activities at the time of the offence and any acts of war which by their
nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel or
equipment of the adverse party.”).
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The Appeals Chamber emphasized that the determination of
whether a particular victim was a lawful target requires a case-bycase analysis.97 Turning to the facts at hand, the Appeals Chamber
determined that the Trial Chamber did not err in finding no
reasonable doubt as to the victim’s non-participation in activities
that “by their nature or purpose were intended to cause actual harm
to the personnel or equipment of the JNA forces in the Dubrovnik
region at the time he was injured”98 and as to the lack of the
requisite nexus between his particular conduct and any possible
participation by members of the Crisis Staff in acts of war.99 In
addition, the Appeals Chamber ruled that it was incumbent upon
the Trial Chamber to confirm that the acts were otherwise
unlawful. This required a determination of whether the victim was
combatant, who could be targeted at any time even when not
directly participating in hostilities, or a civilian.100 Although the
Trial Chamber did not make an explicit ruling in this regard, its
findings were deemed sufficient by the Appeals Chamber to
conclude that the victim was indeed a civilian who remained
protected from attack.101 Accordingly, the conviction was
upheld.102
3. The Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law

¶18

The question of when international humanitarian law is
triggered was the central issue in Boškoski.103 The ICTY Prosecutor
had indicted the defendants for war crimes—murder, cruel
treatment, and wanton destruction of property—allegedly
committed in the village of Ljuboten within the former Yugoslav
97

Id. ¶ 178.
Id. ¶ 183.
99
Id. ¶ 184.
100
Id. ¶ 187.
101
Id. ¶ 187.
102
Strugar received early release for good behavior and undisclosed medical
problems after having served more than two-thirds of his sentence. See Case No.
IT-01-42-ES, Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or
Commutation of Sentence of Pavle Strugar (Jan. 16, 2009).
103
This question also emerged in the Kosovo proceedings. See, e.g., Prosecutor
v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 36-100 (April 3, 2008)
[hereinafter Haradinaj Judgement] (compiling jurisprudence and concluding
that there existed a conflict between the government of the former Yugoslavia
and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the period relative to the
indictment).
98
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Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) during the conflict between the
state security forces (generally the police with support from the
Macedonian army) and the Albanian National Liberation Army
(NLA) that was alleged to have been waged from January to
September 2001.104 The Prosecutor charged the Minister of the
Interior at the time, Ljube Boškoski, under the doctrine of superior
responsibility for failing to prevent the crimes. She charged
Boškoski’s co-defendant, Johan Tarčulovski, with participating in
a joint criminal enterprise to unlawfully attack civilians.105
¶19
In attempting to defeat the war crimes counts in the
indictment, the defendants had earlier challenged the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal on the ground that there was no armed conflict in
FYROM in 2001 that would support charges of war crimes.106 The
Trial Chamber addressed this argument in its Judgment with
reference to the test earlier developed in Tadić107 to confirm the
existence of a non-international armed conflict. This test is
premised on two key factors: (1) the intensity of the conflict, which
includes a consideration of its duration, and (2) the degree of
organization of the parties to the conflict.108 These two elements
serve to distinguish armed conflicts from “banditry, unorganized
and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not
subject to international humanitarian law.”109 The intensity
104

The case came to the ICTY by virtue of a request for deferral from the ICTY
to the authorities in the FYROM. It is the only case before the ICTY involving
that conflict. Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶ 6 (July 10, 2008)
[hereinafter Boškoski Judgement].
105
Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82, Indictment (Mar. 9, 2005).
106
Earlier, the Tribunal ruled that such a determination is a factual question to
be addressed by the Trial Chamber at trial. See Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No.
IT-04-82-AR72.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (July 22,
2005).
107
In determining the applicability of international humanitarian law, including
the prohibitions against war crimes, the Appeals Chamber in Tadić determined
an “armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organised armed groups or between such groups within a State.” Prosecutor v.
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR92, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
108
Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶ 175.
109
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement, ¶ 562 (May 7, 1997).
The Tadić Trial Chamber also referenced the commentary to common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, which set forth some criteria for determining the
existence of a non-international armed conflict:
(1)

That the rebel party has an organized military force, an authority
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elements involve an inquiry into a number of factors, including the
seriousness and destructiveness of the attacks, whether the attacks
have increased in number, the spread of clashes over the territory
and over time, any increase in the mobilization of troops and
weapons, the number of civilians forced to flee from combat zones,
the types and caliber of weapons used, the involvement of military
forces, the number of casualties, the occupation of territory, the
closure of roads and other disruptions to daily life, the existence of
ceasefires and other agreements, international efforts to broker
ceasefires, and attention by the Security Council.110 The
requirement that hostilities be protracted “adds a temporal element
to the definition of armed conflict.”111
responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having
the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.
(2) That the legal Government is obliged to use the regular military forces
against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the
national territory.
(3) (a) the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or
(b) that it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or
(c) that it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the
purpose only of the Convention; or
(d) that the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the UN Security
Council or the General Assembly as being a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or an act of aggression.
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organisation that purports to have the
characteristics of a State.
(b) The insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over the
persons within determinate territory.
(c) The armed forces act under the direction of the organized civil authority
and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.
(d) The insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the
Convention.
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, 49-50 (1952). At the same time, the treaty commentary notes that the
Article is meant to be applied as widely as possible and be applicable where “armed strife
breaks out in a country, but does not fulfil any of the above conditions.” Id. at 50. See
also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-94-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 619 (Dec. 6, 1999)
[hereinafter Akayesu Judgement] (applying these criteria to determine whether there
existed an armed conflict within Rwanda in 1994); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-0366-T, Judgement, ¶ 86 (Nov. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Limaj Judgement] (“no such explicit
requirements for the application of Common Article 3 were intended by the drafters of
the Geneva Conventions.”).

110
Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶ 177 (compiling jurisprudence).
See also Arne Willy Dahl & Magnys Sandbu, The Threshold of Armed Conflict,
45 MIL. LAW & THE LAW OF WAR REV. 369 (2006); Marco Sassòli, Terrorism
and War, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 965 (2006).
111
Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶ 186. But see Haradinaj
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The defendants urged that in applying these factors (and in
particular the intensity element), the Tribunal should not take into
account terrorist activities by the NLA or others, since the whole
point of the Tadić test is to distinguish situations of armed conflict
from terrorist activities and other forms of sporadic violence. The
Trial Chamber agreed in principle that isolated acts of violence,
such as terrorist activities committed in peacetime, would not
trigger common Article 3, because they would not constitute
“protracted” violence between “governmental authorities and
organized groups or between such groups.”112 Relying on a number
of case studies from Israel, Lebanon, Chechnya, Peru, Nigeria, and
the United States, the Chamber concluded, however, that so-called
terrorist acts committed within the context of other armed
engagements may be constitutive of an armed conflict.113 What
matters is “whether the acts are perpetrated in isolation or as part
of a protracted campaign that entails the engagement of both
parties in hostilities. It is immaterial whether the acts of violence
perpetrated may or may not be characterized as terrorist in
nature.”114 The Tribunal cited a number of instances in which acts
that would be considered terrorist in nature (the deliberate
targeting of civilians, for example) nonetheless contributed to the
determination of the existence of an armed conflict.115 The Trial
Chamber thus concluded that “while isolated acts of terrorism may
not reach the threshold of armed conflict, when there is protracted
violence of this type, especially where [the acts] require the
engagement of the armed forces in hostilities, such acts are

Judgement, Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶ 49 (noting that the criterion of protracted
armed violence has been interpreted “as referring more to the intensity of the
armed violence than to its duration.”).
112
Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶¶ 184-185.
113
Id. ¶ 187. In this regard, the Chamber noted that IHL directly addresses itself
to acts of terrorism committed within armed conflict in the form of prohibitions
against committing “acts of terrorism” (Article 33(1), Geneva Convention IV,
and Article 4(2)(d), Additional Protocol II) and “acts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population”
(Article 51(2), Additional Protocol I, and Article 13(2), Additional Protocol II).
114
Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶ 185. See also Prosecutor v.
Kordić & Čerkić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement ¶ 341 (Dec. 17, 2004)
(“[t]he requirement of protracted fighting is significant in excluding mere cases
of civil unrest or single acts of terrorism.”) (emphasis in original).
115
Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶¶ 188-190.
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relevant to assessing the level of intensity with regard to the
existence of an armed conflict.”116
¶21
Turning to the question of the organizational capacity of the
NLA, the Trial Chamber indicated that it would look to a number
of factors,117 including whether the group operated pursuant to a
hierarchical chain of command, rules of engagement and discipline
and a system of ranks, training, and recruitment; whether the group
was capable of implementing common Article 3;118 whether the
group manifested outward symbols of authority and possessed a
leadership corps with the capacity to exert authority over its
members (e.g., a general staff or high command);119 whether the
116

Id. ¶ 190. The Trial Chamber also noted that while the Security Council has
condemned terrorist attacks by rebel groups in the context of internal armed
conflicts, such pronouncements are made on a political, rather than legal, basis.
Id. ¶ 192 (citing inter alia S.C. Res. 1465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1465 (2003)
(condemning attack in Colombia)).
117
Id. ¶¶ 199-203. The Trial Chamber gleaned most of these factors from the
Limaj case. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 93-134
(Nov. 30, 2005). The Tribunal acquitted Limaj, former commander of the KLA
and currently Kosovo’s Minister of Transport, in 2005. A Serbian prosecutor
subsequently indicated he was opening an investigation into crimes that were
not included within the ICTY’s indictment and for which double jeopardy had
not yet attached.
118
The Trial Chamber specifically noted that the standard for the application of
common Article 3 is lower than that required for Additional Protocol II, which
requires a showing that armed groups are under responsible command and
exercise such control over territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol. Boškoski
Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶ 197 (citing Article 1(1), Additional Protocol
II (“This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing
conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not
covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement this Protocol.”)). This higher control
standard is logical given the more detailed rules contained in the Protocol: “there
must be some degree of stability in the control of even a modest area of land for
[the armed groups] to be capable of effectively applying the rules of the
Protocol,” such as caring for the wounded and sick. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶1943 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,
1987).
119
Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶ 195-196 (citing Prosecutor v.
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 120 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić
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group communicated with the international community; and
whether the group was capable of confronting the enemy with
military means.120 The Trial Chamber confirmed that “a high
number of international humanitarian law violations by the
members of an armed group may be indicative of poor discipline
and a lack of hierarchical command in the group.”121 At the same
time, it noted that terrorist acts are often deliberately employed as a
tactic of war and require “a high level of planning and a
coordinated command structure for their implementation.”122 In
other words,
so long as the armed group possesses the
organizational ability to comply with the obligations
of international humanitarian law, even a pattern of
such type of violations would not necessarily
suggest that the party did not possess the level of
organisation required to be a party to an armed
conflict. … [T]he Chamber needs to examine how
the attacks were planned and carried out—that is,
for example, whether they were primarily the result
of a military strategy ordered by those leading the
group or whether they were perpetrated by members
deciding to commit attacks of their own accord.123
This explanation resolves the apparent conundrum between the test
for applying IHL, which requires a showing that a group has the
ability to implement and ensure compliance with IHL, and the fact
that organized armed groups regularly and deliberately commit
IHL violations. It makes clear that such groups may still qualify as

Appeal Judgement]). In addition, in Limaj, the Trial Chamber concluded that the
KLA constituted an “organized armed group” given that it manifested “some
degree of organization” even if not the same level of organization seen in formal
armed forces. Limaj Judgement, Case No. IT-03-66-T ¶ 89. See also Prosecutor
v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement of
Acquittal, ¶¶ 23-24 (June 16, 2004) (also confirming that the KLA constituted a
sufficiently organized armed group to justify the application of IHL).
120
Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶ 198 (citing Haradinaj
Judgement, Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶ 60).
121
Id. ¶ 204.
122
Id.
123
Id. ¶ 205.
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combatants under IHL even when they deliberately breach those
rules.
¶22
Applying this approach to the facts, the Trial Chamber
canvassed a series of incidents and events involving the NLA and
Macedonian authorities during the operative period (including
attacks on police stations and border controls, kidnappings,
ambushes, significant property damage, the occupation of various
villages, and armed clashes).124 Many of the incidents on which the
tribunal relied involved significant military assets (including large
caliber weaponry, tanks, and helicopter gunships) and coordinated
action by camouflaged NLA members. The events, which occurred
throughout an expanding geographical area, provoked an
escalating military response by the FYROM as well as the
attention of the Security Council and the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC). A number of proposed ceasefires failed,
and the central authorities implemented an amnesty law absolving
all those who participated in the conflict from prosecution except
individuals who committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICTY. The Chamber also determined that the NLA controlled
certain villages to such an extent that the state police were unable
to function there.125
¶23
The dead totaled somewhere in the range of 120-150
individuals, with many more injured or displaced.126 The Trial
Chamber opined that the lack of significant harm and property
damage was perhaps due to the exercise of restraint by the parties,
the more localized nature of the clashes, parallel law enforcement
measures, and the NLA’s use of guerilla “strike and withdraw”
tactics, which eluded a large-scale response.127 Although the
FYROM at times employed both a law enforcement and military

124

Id. ¶¶ 212-238, 243. A number of additional alleged incidents could not be
attributed to the NLA because the evidence identified those responsible only as
“terrorists” or “armed Albanian groups.” Id. ¶ 211. Indeed, the Trial Chamber
noted that the evidence suggested that other “local ‘terrorist’-type groups existed
and functioned, probably independently of the NLA” during the period in
question. Id. ¶ 287.
125
Id. ¶ 242. In this regard, the Trial Chamber cited the Akayesu case, in which
the Rwanda Tribunal determined that territory in an armed group’s control is
usually that which has eluded the control of government forces. Akayesu
Judgement, Case No. ICTR-94-4-T, ¶ 626.
126
Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶ 239.
127
Id. ¶ 244.
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legal framework, much of its response was consistent with the
existence of an armed conflict.
¶24
Looking to the degree of organization manifested by the
NLA, the Trial Chamber concluded that although some of the selfserving and contradictory testimony of NLA witnesses was not
entitled to great weight,128 the evidence on balance revealed that
the NLA gradually evolved from a collection of “individually
formed and organized smaller local groups”129 into a fighting force
with an extensive command structure capable of carrying out more
efficient and organized operations.130 In particular, the group
“managed to compel the government to commit the full weight of
its substantial army including reserves, and the large police force
including reserves, to fight” against it in a conflict that brought the
country to the verge of a civil war.131 All told, the Trial Chamber
concluded that an armed conflict existed at all times material to the
Indictment, thus laying the necessary predicate for the war crimes
charges.132
¶25
Turning to the attack on Ljuboten in particular, the Defense
argued that the operation was justified by military necessity. The
defendants tried to establish that there was an NLA presence
within Ljuboten and that the group was using the village as a
logistics base.133 The Defense also argued that Macedonian forces
received fire from houses within the village.134 Based on the
evidence presented, the Trial Chamber concluded that although the
village was not a logistics base per se, there were in fact legitimate
reasons for the police to enter the village because of a suspected
terrorist or NLA presence.135 In addition, it concluded that the
police and army received outgoing fire from some homes,136 but
not from all of the homes that the government forces ultimately
128

Id. ¶¶ 254-265.
Id. ¶ 286.
130
Id. ¶¶ 286-291.
131
Id. ¶ 289.
132
Id. ¶ 249.
133
Id. ¶ 30-31.
134
Id. ¶ 145.
135
Id. ¶ 140.
136
Id. ¶ 378 (noting that while its inhabitants returned police fire, the house was
a military objective whose attack would have offered a definite military
advantage; however, by the time the house was burned by the police, it was
unoccupied and so no longer a lawful military objective). Accordingly, the
prosecution also established the crime of wanton destruction. Id. ¶ 380.
129
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destroyed.137 It further determined that Defense evidence that the
military had only responded to fire from the village directed at
army positions was contrived,138 and that any NLA members
present during the events in question likely offered little resistance
to the well-armed police unit present in the area.139
¶26
With respect to particular IHL violations alleged (mainly the
murder and cruel treatment of Albanian residents), the defendants’
primary defense was that the victims in question had forfeited their
civilian immunity by virtue of directly participating in hostilities.140
No conviction was entered with respect to three victims, because
the evidence was insufficient that the victims were killed by the
police, who were under the defendant’s command, rather than the
army. In any case, there was evidence that the victims had
ammunition in their pockets and that they may have been carrying
firearms.141 Under the circumstances, the Trial Chamber concluded
that the Prosecution did not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the victims were not taking an active part in hostilities at the time
they were killed.142 With respect to other victims, by contrast, there
was sufficient evidence that the crime of murder was committed,
because even if they were members of the NLA, the victims were
unarmed civilians not playing any part in hostilities at the time
they were killed.143 With respect to the cruel treatment counts, the
victims were in detention, and thus hors de combat, so it was of no
moment that they may, at one time, have directly participated in
137

Id. ¶¶ 145-157, 161. See also id. ¶ 369 (concluding that there was no
evidence that the houses burned by the police were being used for military
purposes or that their destruction offered any military advantage).
138
Id. ¶ 170.
139
Id. ¶ 172.
140
Id. ¶¶ 383-391. The doctrine of direct participation applies mutatis mutandis
in non-international armed conflicts. See Article 13, Additional Protocol II:

141

(2) The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be
the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
(3) Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
Additional Protocol II, supra note 89, art. 13(2)-(3).

Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶¶ 334-345.
Id. ¶ 348. See also Strugar Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-01-42-A, ¶ 178
n.457 (noting that “for the purpose of establishing an accused’s criminal
responsibility, the burden of proof of whether a victim was not taking active part
in the hostilities rests with the Prosecution”). Cf. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No.
IT-95-14-A, [Appeal] Judgement, ¶ 111 (July 29, 2004).
143
Boškoski Judgement, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶¶ 306-328.
142
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hostilities.144 Turning to the responsibility of the accused, the Trial
Chamber acquitted Boškoski on the ground that he took adequate
means within his material ability to ensure that criminal conduct
was investigated, but was in essence a political figurehead with no
real power. Tarčulovski, on the other hand, was convicted of the
crimes proven on the ground that he ordered, planned, and
instigated the offenses as head of the police operation in Ljuboten.
4. Particular War Crimes Developments
¶27

With respect to particular war crimes, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone issued an interesting decision with respect to the war
crime of terrorism, also of immediate relevance to “war on terror”
proceedings in the United States.145 In the CDF case, the Trial
Chamber of the SCSL had acquitted the defendants of acts of
terrorism on the ground that it had not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendants possessed the necessary mens
rea—the specific intent to cause terror.146 The Appeals Chamber
affirmed the Trial Chamber’s determination that the evidence did
not establish that the defendants, charged with superior
responsibility and with aiding and abetting acts of terrorism, knew
that the direct perpetrators were acting with the necessary intent to
spread terror among the civilian population.147 Accordingly, the
findings of not guilty went undisturbed.148
144

Id. ¶ 388.
SCSL Statute, supra note 29, art. 3(d) (granting jurisdiction to prosecute acts
of terrorism in violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
Articles 4(d)(2) and 13(2) of Additional Protocol II). In this regard, the SCSL
noted that Article 13(2)’s prohibition is narrower than that contained in Article
4(d)(2) as it requires a showing that the individual had the specific intent to
spread terror among the civilian population. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No.
SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 345-348 (May 28, 2008) [hereinafter CDF Appeal
Judgment]. It determined that the latter crime was the charged crime and
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the following elements:
145

146

The commission of acts or threats of violence;
That the offender willfully made the civilian population (or individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities) the object of those acts or threats of violence; and
That the acts or threats of violence were carried out with the specific intent to spread
terror (i.e., extreme fear) among the civilian population.
Id. ¶¶ 350, 352.

Id. ¶¶ 729-731, 743, 779-780, 879.
Id. ¶¶ 368-370, 373, 376.
148
Id. ¶ 379.
147
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After a rocky start,149 the crime of recruiting child soldiers is
now firmly entrenched in the war crimes canon.150 In the Civil
Defense Forces (CDF) case, a Trial Chamber of the SCSL found
Allieu Kondewa guilty of “enlisting children under the age of 15
into an armed force or group and/or using them to participate
actively in hostilities” as set forth in Article 4(c) of the SCSL
Statute by virtue of his role initiating child soldiers for battle.151 On
appeal, Kondewa argued that initiation should not have been
considered the equivalent of enlistment.152 The Appeals Chamber
noted that enlistment means “‘accepting and enrolling individuals
when they volunteer to join an armed force or group,’” that there
must be a nexus between the act of the accused and a child joining
an armed force or group,153 and that “enlistment” should not be
narrowly defined as a formal process.154 Reviewing the facts in the
record, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the child soldier in
question had been forcibly enlisted when he was captured by CDF
forces and put to work prior to his initiation.155 Accordingly, the
Appeal Chamber reversed the conviction on the count of enlisting
child soldiers.156 The acquittal of Kondewa’s co-accused, Moinina
149

Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on
Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004) (confirming
the availability of the charge in the face of a vigorous nullum crimen sine lege
defense).
150
Several ICC indictments feature the crime of using child soldiers. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Indictment (Aug. 29, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/-4-01/07, Indictment (2008).
151
Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 968-970 (Aug.
2, 2007) [hereinafter CDF Trial Judgment]. Specifically, the Trial Chamber
found him guilty of initiating only one child soldier, Witness TF2-004, because
the ages of other initiates had not been conclusively established. The Trial
Chamber did not consider Kondewa’s liability for using child soldiers, as it
considered that an alternative charge to enlistment. Id. ¶ 971. This ruling was
upheld on appeal. CDF Appeal Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, ¶ 132.
152
CDF Appeal Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, ¶ 136.
153
Id. ¶ 139 (citing Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, ¶ 735 (June
20 2007); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/-4-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 247 (Jan. 29, 2007).
154
Id. ¶ 144.
155
Id. ¶ 142.
156
Id. ¶ 145. Judge Renate Winter (the President of the SCSL) entered a dissent,
arguing that “enlistment may in some circumstances be a process involving
several acts which may substantially further the enrolment and acceptance of a
child under the age of fifteen into an armed force or group. Religious initiation,
military training and the signing of a certificate declaring a child fit for combat
may all be acts that substantially further a child’s enlistment.” Prosecutor v.
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Fofana,157 was upheld on appeal on the ground that his mere
presence at meetings in which child soldiers were referenced or
present was insufficient to render Fofana personally involved in
such crimes.158
5. War Crimes Before the International Criminal Court
¶29

These decisions draw attention to the enhanced ability of ICL
judges to decide complex questions of IHL in a wartime context.
The ICTY judges in particular have proven themselves to be
increasingly adept at evaluating and assimilating expert testimony
involving questions of military organization and strategy while
adjudicating questions of conflict classification, military necessity,
and proportionality. The judges revealed a high degree of technical
acuity with respect to the special features of particular weapons
systems, including the weapons’ effective zone (“an area around
[a] landed munition within which it may cause death or injury”),
the error ellipse (“the percentage of munitions fired from a
particular weapon system … [that] can be expected to land within
a given area of the aiming point”), and expenditure norms (which
“indicate how many munitions of a certain type must be fired at a
particular objective to militarily achieve an assurance of destroying
or neutralizing the objective”).159 In their judgments, the judges
readily assessed expert and percipient evidence about weapon
trajectories, traces, and strike markings alongside documentary
evidence—often of uncertain provenance—and the results of
forensic anthropological investigations.
Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Honourable
Justice Renate Winter, ¶ 12 (May 28, 2008) [hereinafter Winter CDF Dissent].
In addition, she reasoned that “[i]n the situation where there are no formal or
informal processes for reenlisting individuals, especially children, the ‘use’ of a
child to participate actively in hostilities may amount to enlistment.” Id. ¶ 13.
She also argued that it had been established that Kondewa was guilty of
committing the crime of enlisting more than one child and of using children in
armed conflict. Id. ¶¶ 21, 30.
157
CDF Trial Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, ¶¶ 960-962.
158
CDF Appeal Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, ¶¶ 152-153. Judge Winter
dissented here as well, arguing that Fofana’s presence at meetings “constituted
tacit approval, encouragement and moral support to the commanders and
Kamajors to continue to enlist and use children under the age of 15 to participate
actively in hostilities.” Winter CDF Dissent, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, ¶ 37.
159
William J. Fenrick, The Prosecution of Unlawful Attack Cases Before the
ICTY, 7 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW 153, 162 (2004).
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A primary objection of the United States to the ICC is that
the Court’s judges, who may lack any formal military experience,
cannot be trusted to apply and interpret the fundamental but
somewhat elastic principles of IHL in the same way that those who
plan and implement U.S. military strategy will. The assumption is
that U.S. officials and service members are vulnerable to
politicized prosecutions before the ICC for purported war crimes
committed in the many theaters of war in which they operate as
combatants, occupiers, peacekeepers or in other capacities.
Although this argument tends to be articulated less often than other
more specious arguments against the ICC,160 it is probably the
primary reason the United States has opposed the Court to date.
This collection of war crimes decisions reveal that the ICL judges
are able to conduct methodical, well-reasoned, and sophisticated
IHL analysis and that IHL concepts are not so malleable as to
support overly expansive judicial interpretations. To be sure, we
have little indication as to how the ICC judges will approach these
crimes and it may take some time before they develop the
institutional competency exhibited by the ICTY. Several of the
ICC’s judges, however, did serve on the ad hoc tribunals as sitting
(e.g., Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito) or ad litem (e.g., Judge
Fatoumata Dembele Diarra) judges.
C. Crimes Against Humanity

¶31

The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) issued what is
likely the most significant decision on crimes against humanity in
2008.161 In the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) case,
the Trial Chamber originally dropped charges of forced marriage
against defendants Alex Timba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and

160

See, e.g., Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court,
25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 840 (2002).
161
Another ruling of note emerged from the ICTY in Haradinaj. There, a Trial
Chamber concluded that there was no attack against a civilian population that
could be attributed to the KLA in the region in question. Haradinaj Judgement,
Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶ 118-122. In particular, the Tribunal concluded that
many Serbs left their homes out of fear of being caught up in the escalating
armed conflict between the KLA and Serbian forces, not necessarily because
they were the targets of attack. Id. ¶ 119. In addition, many individuals who
were ill-treated were singled out for reasons that were personal to them rather
than on account of their membership in a civilian population. Id. ¶ 122.
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Santigie Borbor Kanu.162 The Prosecution had charged the crimes
of forced marriage as crimes against humanity under the residual
clause Article 2(i) penalizing “other inhumane acts.” The
definition of crimes against humanity in the SCSL Statute also
contains an open-ended list of sexual crimes at Article 2(g), which
includes “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence.”163 In dismissing
the forced marriage charges for redundancy, a majority of the Trial
Chamber ruled that the convictions for sexual slavery encompassed
all the alleged conduct of the accused. As a matter of statutory
construction, the Trial Chamber determined that all acts of a sexual
nature were encompassed in Article 2(g). It saw no lacuna in the
law that would merit the recognition of the novel “inhumane act”
of “forced marriage” separate and apart from the existing crime of
sexual slavery.164 The Trial Chamber also indicated that any such
crime would not be of comparable gravity to other, enumerated
crimes against humanity and so could not be charged as an “other
inhumane act.” Exemplifying the normative redundancy of ICL,
the crime of forced marriage had also been charged as the war
crime of committing “outrages upon personal dignity” (as
prohibited by common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions), but
the Trial Chamber again determined that the facts adduced by the
Prosecution did not indicate the commission of a non-sexual crime
of forced marriage that did not wholly overlap with the crime of
“sexual slavery.”165
¶32
The Prosecutor appealed. In a landmark opinion, the Appeals
Chamber reversed in February 2008.166 The Chamber noted that the
crime of forced marriage is not exclusively, or even
predominantly, sexual and as such is not encompassed in the crime
of sexual slavery.167 Rather, it noted, forced marriage involves the
imposition of the status of marriage and a conjugal association by
force, or threat of force. The gravamen of the offense is the
assertion of a claim of right and ownership by the “husband” over
the “wife,” which involves the right to demand a whole range of
162

Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 115 (Feb. 22,
2008) [hereinafter AFRC Appeal Judgment].
163
SCSL Statute, supra note 29.
164
AFRC Appeal Judgment, SCSL-2004-16-A, ¶ 187.
165
Id. ¶¶ 701-704.
166
Id. ¶¶ 175-203.
167
Id. ¶¶ 190.
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“conjugal duties” (including, but not at all limited to, nonconsensual sex) in exchange for support and protection.168 In
reversing the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber largely
vindicated the dissent written by Justice Theresa Doherty of the
Trial Chamber.169
¶33
The Appeals Chamber’s view of the crime was consistent
with the testimony that emerged at trial. Women testified that they
were often placed in extreme danger as they were forced to “care
for” their putative husbands in active war zones and risked severe
punishment if they did not comply with their husbands’ orders. As
they described it, the crime encompassed a constellation of
violations, including abduction, forced labor, deprivations of
liberty, corporeal punishment and assault, as well as sexual
violence. Indeed, a man’s motive in taking a so-called “bush wife”
clearly went beyond the desire for sex, as the statistics on rape in
Sierra Leone reveal that non-consensual sex was readily available
to the warring parties. (Some studies suggest that upwards of
60,000 women were made victim to sexual violence in war-torn
Sierra Leone).170 By being forced into this union with men
involved in the commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, women experienced severe physical and mental trauma.
This harm was heightened by the fact that many women have been
ostracized by their communities since the end of the war for being
affiliated in such an intimate way with a member of one of the
warring parties.171
¶34
Although it recognized the crime against humanity of forced
marriage in theory, the Appeals Chamber declined to enter a fresh
conviction. Rather, the Chamber emphasized the expressive
function of its judgment:
The Appeals Chamber is convinced that society’s
disapproval of the forceful abduction and use of
women and girls as forced conjugal partners as part
of a widespread or systematic attack against the
civilian population is adequately reflected by
168

Id. ¶¶ 189-190.
Id. ¶¶ 192-196.
170
UNIFEM, Facts & Figures on Violence Against Women,
http://www.unifem.org/campaigns/vaw/facts_figures.php?page=7 (last visited
June 7, 2009).
171
AFRC Appeal Judgment, SCSL-2004-16-A, ¶¶ 192-196.
169
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recognizing that such conduct is criminal and that it
constitutes an “Other Inhumane Act” capable of
incurring individual criminal responsibility in
international law.172
In the subsequent RUF Judgment issued in 2009, the SCSL finally
entered convictions for the crime of forced marriage.173
¶35
The reasoning in these judgments have paved the way for
prosecutions for forced marriage before the ICC, which is
considering crimes arising out of conflicts in Uganda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo that involve the extensive practice
of forced marriage. Article 7(g) of the ICC Statute contains an
expansive list of crime of sexual violence that includes “[r]ape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity.”174 The ICC’s “Other Inhumane Acts” clause at Article
7(k) is formulated as “[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.”175 These formulations lend themselves
to the same reasoning employed by the SCSL if the ICC is so
inclined. In addition, counsel for civil parties before the ECCC
requested in February 2009 that the investigation be expanded to
cover forced marriage under the Khmer Rouge.176
172

Id. ¶ 202.
Prosecutor v. Sesay & Kallon, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (Feb. 25,
2009). By contrast, in the CDF case, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL denied
the Prosecutor’s efforts to appeal a prior decision in which the Trial Chamber
refused to allow the Prosecutor to amend the indictment to add sexual violence
counts to the indictment on the ground that ruling on the appeal would amount
to an academic exercise given that the Prosecutor did not seek any remedy other
than a determination that the prior decision constituted an error of law. CDF
Appeal Judgment, SCSL-04-14-A, ¶ 426. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber
ruled that the decision of the Trial Chamber to exclude evidence of sexual
violence at trial on grounds of prejudice to the accused was erroneous. Id. ¶ 446.
Although the Indictment was defective in that it did not charge acts of sexual
violence per se, it did include the charge of “other inhumane acts” (which can
include acts of sexual violence), and the Prosecutor subsequently and adequately
put the defendant on notice through its filings and oral submissions that
evidence of sexual violence would be submitted to establish that charge. Id. ¶¶
443-446.
174
ICC Statute, supra note 31, art. 7(1)(g).
175
Id. art. 7(1)(k).
176
Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 001-18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, Civil
Parties’ Co-Lawyers’ Request for Supplementary Preliminary Investigations
173
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Crimes of sexual violence feature prominently in many of the
cases pending before the ICC,177 whose constitutive statute
contains groundbreaking structural, procedural, and substantive
provisions to ensure gender justice.178 Within the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) situation, both Germain Katanga and
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui have been indicted179 for crimes against
(Feb. 9, 2009) (noting that mass weddings were ordered under the Khmer
Rouge).
177
Given the widespread sexual violence committed in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the absence of gender violence crimes in the Lubanga indictment
prompted criticism from advocates for gender justice, including Radhika
Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Representative on Children and Armed
Conflict. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1229-AnxA,
Written Submissions of the United Nations Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict Submitted in Application of
Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Mar. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/AmicuscuriaeICCLubanga.pdf.
178
See Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, Making a Statement: A Review
of Charges and Prosecutions for Gender-based Crimes before the International
Criminal
Court
(June
2008),
available
at
http://www.iccwomen.org/publications/articles/docs/MakingAStatementWeb_Final.pdf (discussing existing and potential gender violence charges). See
Valerie Oosterveld, Gender-Sensitive Justice & the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda: Lessons Learned for the International Criminal Court, 12
NEW ENGL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119, 128 (2005) (noting stronger gender
violence policies within the ICC prosecutorial office than before the ICTR).
179
Judge Anita Ušacka partially dissented from the confirmation decision on the
sexual violence crimes, arguing that the Prosecutor’s evidence was not
sufficiently strong to establish “substantial grounds to believe” that the suspects
are criminally responsible for the crimes of sexual violence (the standard
necessary to confirm the indictment pursuant to Article 61 of the ICC Statute).
In her estimation, the evidence did not suggest either that the suspects intended
for rape and sexual slavery to be committed during the attack in question or that
the suspects would know that these acts would be committed “in the ordinary
course of events.” Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Partly Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Anita Ušacka, ¶¶ 14, 19-22 (Sept. 30, 2008). Falling sway to the
misperception that acts of sexual violence committed during armed conflicts or
repression are simply opportunistic or private crimes reflecting personal
motives, Judge Ušacka reasoned that general evidence that crimes of rape and
sexual slavery were committed throughout Ituri is insufficient to infer the
suspects’ intent and knowledge that the particular crimes charged would occur
or had occurred. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 568-69 (Sept. 30, 2008)
(noting that the rape and sexual slavery of women and girls was a common
practice and was widely known among combatants). The issuance of Security
Council Resolution 1820 definitively confirms that crimes of sexual violence are
integral to any armed conflict, genocide, or campaign of ethnic cleansing rather
than an isolated or peripheral phenomena. See S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. No.
S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008). Indeed, the Resolution notes that gender violence
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humanity and war crimes for the commission of sexual slavery,
rape, and outrages upon personal dignity.180 Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, a citizen of the DRC who is implicated for his
involvement in crimes within the Central African Republic (CAR),
will likely be prosecuted for rape as a crime against humanity and
a war crime in a situation in which mass sexual violence featured
more prominently than mass murder.181 Several Ugandan
defendants are to be prosecuted for crimes of sexual violence
(sexual enslavement as a crime against humanity and rape as a war
crime or a crime against humanity).182 All outstanding Darfur arrest
warrants include gender violence counts (viz. rape, outrages upon
personal dignity, and persecutory gender violence).183 Chief
is regularly employed to exacerbate other forms of violence and repression.
180
These counts barely made it into the indictment. In connection with the
confirmation process, the Prosecutor requested protective measures from the
Registry for two witnesses whose testimony was relevant to the sexual violence
counts. The request was, however, rejected by the Registrar. Nonetheless, the
Prosecutor arranged himself for the preventative relocation of the witnesses
without authorization, citing his obligations to ensure the security of witnesses
under Article 68(1) of the Statute. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Corrigendum to the Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the
Confirmation Hearing, Preventative Relocation and Disclosure under Article
67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules (Apr. 25, 2008) (detailing lack of
authority for prosecutorial action). At the confirmation hearing, the Court ruled
that even redacted or summary versions of the witnesses’ testimony could not be
admitted into evidence, because the witnesses were in effect “unprotected” and
thus at risk. Eventually, the witnesses were relocated by the Registrar, which
opened the way for their evidence to be considered and for the reintroduction of
the sexual violence charges. Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Sept. 30, 2008). The
defendants’ request to appeal these decisions was rejected. Prosecutor v.
Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Applications for
Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Admission of the Evidence of Witnesses
132 and 287 and on the Leave to Appeal on the Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges (Oct. 24, 2008).
181
See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo (June 10, 2008).
182
See, e.g., Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of
Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September
2005 (Sept. 27, 2005). Two Ugandan defendants, Vincent Otti and Raska
Lukwiya, have since died. The other arrest warrants (Okot Odhiambo and
Dominic Ongwen) do not include sexual violence charges. See, e.g., Situation in
Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-56, Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo
(July 8, 2005).
183
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for
Ali Kushayb (Apr. 27, 2007) (charging acts of rape as crimes against humanity
and war crimes); Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun (April 27, 2007) (same).
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Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo also appointed feminist law professor
Catherine MacKinnon as a dedicated Gender Advisor in 2008,184
although the Court has yet to appoint a Gender Legal Advisor for
the entire institution.
¶37
By contrast, the movement to ensure gender justice received
setbacks before the ICTY and ICTR in 2008. In July, the ICTY
refused to allow the prosecution to amend the indictment in the
Lukić case to include sexual violence charges. The Lukić cousins,
Milan and Sredoje, stand accused of war crimes and crimes against
humanity in the region of Višegrad, where their paramilitary
group, the “White Eagles,” was active. The men were initially
indicted for a number of crimes, but no crimes of gender violence.
Under the leadership of Swiss jurist Carla Del Ponte, the
prosecutor’s office had indicated an interest in amending the
indictment to include charges concerning the crimes of rape,
enslavement, and torture committed against women, and was given
until November 2007 to do so. No amendment was forthcoming,
ostensibly because Del Ponte felt that to lengthen the prosecutor’s
case would be contrary to the U.N. Security Council-mandated
Completion Strategy.
¶38
After Del Ponte stepped down in January 2008, her
replacement—Belgian jurist Serge Brammertz—attempted to
amend the indictment in June 2008, well after the deadline for
doing so. In addition to clarifying the charged forms of
responsibility, Brammertz sought to add new counts concerning
the crimes of rape, torture, and enslavement allegedly committed
within a rape camp established by the defendants. Many of the
victims and witnesses to these crimes had already been disclosed to
the defendants. Indeed, 18 of the 26 female witnesses on the
prosecutor’s witness list apparently could testify about the
defendants’ involvement in sexual violence. In support of his
untimely motion, Brammertz argued that the crimes should be
charged because they were grave and systematic in nature; they
were integral to other persecutory policies employed in Višegrad;
the Prosecutor did not need to call new witnesses; the defense
See also Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the
Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute (Apr. 27, 2007).
184
See Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, ICC Prosecutor
Appoints Prof. Catharine A. MacKinnon as Special Adviser on Gender Crimes,
ICC-OTP-20081126-PR377 (Nov. 26, 2008), available at http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/Go?id=30484f06-076a-4e20-935a-8e603475cc37&lan=en-GB.
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would have adequate time to meet the new charges; the testimony
would assist the prosecutor in meeting the defendants’ apparent
alibi defenses; and—most importantly—to include the testimony
and counts was necessary “in the interest of justice” in order to
allow the witnesses to testify fully about the harm they suffered at
the hands of the defendants and to establish the full truth of the
defendants’ crimes.185 In a July 8, 2008 ruling, the ICTY denied the
motion to amend the indictment on the ground that allowing the
amendment after the Prosecutor’s unnecessary delay would unduly
prejudice the accused.186
¶39
A similar setback took place before the ICTR. A few weeks
prior the start of the trial of Tharcisse Muvunyi before the ICTR,
the Prosecution sought to withdraw rape charges altogether on the
grounds that witnesses could not be traced and others refused to
testify.187 The Trial Chamber denied the Prosecutor’s request to
withdraw the rape charge reasoning that the Prosecution had not
provided sufficient cause for reconsidering the confirmation of the
original indictment and the Defense had already expended time
and resources preparing to defend the charges.188 The Trial
Chamber also rejected other proposed amendments amounting to
new charges as prejudicial where the Prosecution could not justify
the delay in seeking the changes. The Trial Chamber instructed the
Prosecution that it need not amend the indictment to remove the
sexual violence counts; rather, it could simply present no evidence
at trial and take an acquittal. At trial, however, the Prosecution
185

See Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Prosecutor
Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Second Amended Indictment and on
Prosecution Motion to Include U.N. Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) as
Additional Supporting Material to Proposed Third Amended Indictment as well
as on Milan Lukić’s Request for Reconsideration or Certification of the PreTrial Judge’s Order of 19 June 2008, ¶¶ 12-13 (July 8, 2008).
186
Id. ¶¶ 57-64.
187
See Letter from Dr. Alex Obote-Odora, Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC,
to Ms. Brunet, on behalf of the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in
Conflict Situations and others (Feb. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVicti
mssDeniedJustice/responseICTRmuvunyi.pdf (explaining decision to withdraw
sexual violence counts).
188
See Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 2000-55A-PT, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 28-34 (Feb.
23, 2005). The Trial Chamber also rejected other proposed amendments
amounting to new charges as prejudicial where the Prosecution could not justify
the delay in seeking the changes. Id. ¶¶ 40-50.
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managed to locate and present the testimony of three rape victims,
whose harrowing testimony was deemed reliable by the Trial
Chamber. None of the witnesses, however, was raped by the
specific group of subordinates alleged in the indictment.
Accordingly, the defendant was acquitted on these counts.189
¶40
Both sides appealed, with the Prosecution alleging error in
the rape acquittals. In August 2008, the Appeals Chamber quashed
the original convictions and ruled that the defendant should be
partially retried on the incitement to genocide count alone, because
the indictment was defective in that it failed to give adequate
notice to the accused of the charges and of the theories of liability,
and because the Trial Chamber did not adequately state the reasons
for Muvunyi’s conviction. With respect to the rape charges, the
Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber that the charges
proven did not correspond to the allegations in the indictment, and
that variances between the evidence adduced at trial and the
allegations within the indictment remained un-remedied during the
pre-trial period.190
¶41
Unrelated to sexual violence, two rather technical rulings on
the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity in the Martić
Appeals Judgment and the Civilian Defense Force Appeals
Judgment are also of note. In Martić, the ICTY Prosecutor
appealed certain crimes against humanity acquittals based on the
Trial Chamber’s determination that hors-de-combat combatants
could not be the victims of crimes against humanity.191 The Trial
Chamber had reasoned that charging abuses against combatants
who were hors de combat as crimes against humanity would
impermissibly blur the principle of distinction between civilians
and combatants. In so ruling, the Trial Chamber had relied upon
the negative definition of civilian contained within Article 50 of
Additional Protocol I:192 “A civilian is any person who does not
189

Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 400-09
(Sept. 12, 2006).
190
Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 160-69
(Aug. 29, 2008).
191
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgement, ¶ 56 (Oct. 8, 2008)
[hereinafter Martić Appeal Judgement]. See generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 90-91 (June 12, 2002).
192
Martić Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ¶¶ 51-55. In Blaškić, the
Appeals Chamber invoked this definition as indicative of customary
international law to confirm that members of the armed forces could not claim
civilian status. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 110-
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belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A
(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of
this Protocol.”193 This, the Prosecution had argued, improperly
excluded persons who were not lawful targets under IHL from the
protections of the prohibition of crimes against humanity.194 Based
upon this interpretation of the term “civilian,” the Trial Chamber
acquitted the defendant of certain charged crimes against humanity
involving hors de combat victims.195
¶42
On appeal, the Prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber
erred in applying the definition of “civilian” from IHL to interpret
the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity. In addition, it
argued that the term “civilian” in the definition of crimes against
humanity modifies the chapeau requirement of the existence of a
widespread or systematic attack and does not imply that only
civilians can be the victims of crimes against humanity.196 The
point of this modifier in that context, the Prosecution argued, is to
exclude legitimate combat action from the scope of the prohibitive
against crimes against humanity.197
¶43
Further integrating the concepts of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, the Appeals Chamber ruled that the
Prosecution’s proposed expansion of the term “civilian” in Article
5 to include those hors de combat is contrary to the natural and
ordinary meaning of the concept.198 It concluded that “the
16 (July 29, 2004).
193
The Geneva Convention provisions referenced define prisoners of war (and
by implication privileged combatants). Article 43 of Additional Protocol I more
directly define the meaning of “armed forces”:

194

1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party
for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a
government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed
forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia,
shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict.
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical
personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are
combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in
hostilities.
Protocol I, supra note 60, art. 43.

Martić Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ¶ 278.
Id. ¶¶ 251-59, 277, 390-91, 407-22.
196
Id. ¶ 275.
197
Id. ¶ 281.
198
Id. ¶ 297.
195
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fundamental character of the notion of civilian in international
humanitarian law and international criminal law militates against
giving it differing meanings under Article 3 and Article 5 of the
Statute.”199 Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber ruled that
combatants who were hors de combat could be the victims of
crimes against humanity. The ICTY appropriately confirmed that
the chapeau element of crimes against humanity requires that the
widespread or systematic attack be against a civilian population,
but not necessarily that every victim be a civilian. This outcome is
consistent with the Barbie case in France (which determined that
members of the French resistance could be the victims of crimes
against humanity)200 in which combatants formed part of the
civilian population that was the subject of the widespread or
systematic attack.
¶44
Similarly, in the CDF case, the SCSL Trial Chamber ruled
that although there was a widespread attack in the region in
question, it had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
“the civilian population was the primary object of the attack” as
the evidence suggested that the “attacks were directed against the
rebels or juntas that controlled” the area.201 Thus, it ruled, that “the
targeting of a select group of civilians—for example, the targeted
killing of a number of political opponents—cannot [constitute
crimes against humanity as] the attack [must be] directed against a
civilian ‘population’, rather than against a limited and randomly
selected number of individuals.”202 The Appeals Chamber sided
with the Prosecution in confirming that an attack against a civilian
population can still provide the predicate for crimes against
humanity charges even where “the ultimate objective of the
fighting force was legitimate and/or aimed at responding to
aggressors.”203 It thus determined that the Trial Chamber had
199

Id. ¶ 299.
Fédération Nationale des Déportes et Internes Résistants et Patriots v. Barbie,
78 I.L.R. 125, 140 (Fr. Cour de Cassation 1985). See also Fédération Nationale
des Déportes et Internes Résistants et Patriots v. Touvier, 100 I.L.R. 338, 352
(Fr. Cour de Cassation 1992).
201
Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 693 (Aug. 2,
2007).
202
Id. ¶ 119. There were also allegations that police officers were targeted in one
of the attacks in question. CDF Appeal Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, ¶¶
260-61.
203
CDF Appeal Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, ¶ 247. In this case, the
Appeals Chamber also rejected the Trial Chamber’s reasoning that the
200
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confused the purpose of the attack with the object or target of the
attack.204 Likewise, it confirmed that the attack on the civilian
population need not be based upon a specific discriminatory
ground.205 The Appeals Chamber also agreed that, in principle,
there may be parallel or co-existing attacks: one directed against a
civilian population alongside one targeting opposing forces.206
¶45
Turning to the facts, the parties disputed whether the
evidence suggested that attacks were specifically directed against a
civilian population as a whole or whether particular “collaborators”
were specifically targeted for their affiliation with opposing forces
and some additional civilian deaths amounted to “collateral
victims.”207 The Appeals Chamber confirmed that perceived
collaborators and police officers are part of the civilian population,
so long as they do not fight alongside or under the direction of the
military.208 In addition, the evidence revealed that there were
locations that became the object of Kamajor attacks after the rebels
had withdrawn, attesting that civilian victims were not mere
incidental or collateral targets of a legitimate military attack.209
Thus, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber had
erred in acquitting the defendants of crimes against humanity in
these instances and substituted guilty verdicts.210

defendants’ sentences should be mitigated, because the Kamajors were engaged
in a “just cause” or exercising a “civic duty” to restore democracy to Sierra
Leone. Id. ¶¶ 554-59. The Appeals Chamber reasoned that as an international
court, its duty was to promote international interests in protecting humanity and
not national interests or local sentiments. Id. ¶¶ 560-65. Accordingly, it
increased the defendants’ sentences. Id. ¶ 567. See also Winter CDF Dissent,
Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, ¶ 4 (noting that as a hybrid international court, the
SCSL “must never look into the ‘righteousness’ of any particular political
cause”).
204
CDF Appeal Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, ¶¶ 299-300.
205
Id. ¶¶ 262-63.
206
Id. ¶ 251.
207
Id. ¶¶ 254-56.
208
See id. ¶¶ 261, 264.
209
Id. ¶¶ 303-06.
210
Id. ¶ 322. The sentences were correspondingly amended. See id. ¶ 567. But
see Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Partially Dissenting Opinion
of Honourable Justice George Gelaga King, ¶¶ 32-58 (May 28, 2008) (reasoning
that the Trial Chamber had been correct to reject the crimes against humanity
charge under the circumstances).
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D. Genocide
¶46

The ICTR continues to be the only international tribunal
routinely adjudicating the crime of genocide.211 As a follow up to
the high profile Media Case from 2007,212 in 2008 the ICTR
released its judgment against Simon Bikindi, a well-known
Rwandan singer, songwriter, and dancer who was accused of
committing genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement
to commit genocide, and various crimes against humanity,
including persecution, against members of the Tutsi group.213 The
Trial Chamber rejected most of the Prosecution’s allegations that
Bikindi collaborated with members of the government to
militarize, indoctrinate, recruit, or train Hutu Power groups or the
Interahamwe214 or to otherwise implement a common plan215 or
conspiracy216 to eliminate the Tutsi group; that he in any way
controlled the programming of Radio Télévision Libre des Milles
Collines (RTLM), the infamous radio station blamed for inciting
the genocide in Rwanda;217 that he participated in rallies that led to
attacks on Tutsi individuals;218 or that he committed any acts of
genocidal violence himself.219 It did find, however, that Bikindi at
one point traveled with an Interahamwe convoy outfitted with
public address system and “made exhortations to kill Tutsi.”220

211
Genocide charges are pending before the ICTY in a handful of cases. In
addition to the case against Radovan Karadžić, see supra note 4, several of the
defendants in the Vujadin Popović et al. case (all members of the Bosnian Serb
Army) have been charged with genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and
extermination in connection with the Srebrenica massacre. Prosecutor v.
Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Indictment (Aug. 4, 2006). Their trial is
ongoing.
212
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-96-11-A, Judgement (Nov. 28,
2007) [hereinafter Nahimana Appeal Judgement]. See George William
Mugwanya, Recent Trends in International Criminal Law: Perspectives from the
U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS.
415, 436-40 (2008).
213
Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgement (Dec. 2, 2008)
[hereinafter Bikindi Judgement].
214
Id. ¶¶ 88, 103, 111
215
Id. ¶ 402.
216
Id. ¶¶ 406-07.
217
Id. ¶ 122.
218
Id. ¶¶ 183-85.
219
Id. ¶¶ 288-366, 410.
220
Id. ¶ 285.
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The most interesting aspect of the opinion is the Trial
Chamber’s analysis of Bikindi’s lyrics with the assistance of
linguistics experts presented by both sides.221 The Trial Chamber
confirmed that that definitions of speech and expression under
international law “are broad enough to include artistic expression
such as songs.”222 At the same time, it noted that courts must tread
lightly where international speech rights are concerned and be
careful to distinguish between speech that may violate international
human rights norms and speech that constitutes an international
crime, such as incitement to genocide223 or persecution as a crime
against humanity.224 The Trial Chamber concluded that Bikindi’s
songs advocated Hutu unity against a common Tutsi foe, incited
ethnic hatred, raised the morale of Interahamwe members while
they were killing Tutsi, and inspired action among his listeners.225
At the same time, it declined to rule that Bikindi composed the
songs “with the specific intention to incite … attacks and killings,
even if they were used to that effect” during the genocide.226 While
noting that Bikindi’s songs were used by RTLM in a propaganda
campaign to promote hatred for, and to incite violence against, the
Tutsi populace,227 the Trial Chamber concluded that Bikindi played
no role in the dissemination or deployment of his songs during the
period of the genocide.228 Thus, Bikindi was convicted solely for
his role in inciting genocide while part of the Interahamwe
221

See id. ¶¶ 186-264.
Id. ¶ 384.
223
The Trial Chamber noted that to determine whether speech rises to the level
of incitement to commit genocide, the Tribunal must look to “the cultural and
linguistic content; the political and community affiliation of the author; its
audience; and how the message was understood by its intended audience, i.e.,
whether the members of the audience to whom the message was directed
understood its implication.” Id. ¶ 387.
224
Id. ¶ 391 (noting that hate speech that does not directly call for genocide may
constitute persecution: “an act or omission that discriminates in fact and that
denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in international
customary or treaty law [such as the right to dignity], and was carried out
deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds”). See
also Nahimana Appeal Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-11-A, ¶ 985. The Trial
Chamber confirmed that the underlying constitutive act did not have to be
criminal to constitute persecution so long as the other elements of that offense
are present. Bikindi Judgement, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, ¶ 392.
225
Id. ¶¶ 247-55.
226
Id. ¶ 255.
227
Id. ¶ 264.
228
Id. ¶ 421.
222
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convoy.229 The Trial Chamber sentenced him to fifteen years’
imprisonment.230
¶48
The ICC was poised to consider its first genocide case with
the Prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant for President
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan. On July 14, 2008, the
ICC Prosecutor sought to charge al-Bashir with three counts of
genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity, and two counts
of war crimes.231 By proposing genocide charges based on alBashir’s alleged responsibility for attacks against protected groups
(members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes), the Prosecutor
implicitly rejected the conclusion reached by a United Nations
Commission of Inquiry232 that there was insufficient evidence to
conclude the existence of a state policy to commit genocide.233 To
prove that there were reasonable grounds to conclude the
defendant acted with genocide intent, the Prosecutor submitted
data attesting to the scale of the violence against protected groups;
statements of the accused and members of his inner circle;
evidence that attacks continued in camps, implying that the intent
was not merely to displace groups but to eliminate them;
staggering proof of sexual violence; and evidence that Sudanese
and janjaweed forces sought to destroy the very means of survival
of the groups.234 Early in 2009, however, a Pre-Trial Chamber of
229

Id. ¶ 422. Relatedly, in Zigiranyirazo, the Prosecutor failed to present
evidence that established, beyond a reasonable doubt, the substance of speeches
allegedly given by the accused in advance of any genocidal massacre.
Accordingly, the accused was acquitted of ordering and instigating genocide.
See Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-01-73-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 404-05
(Dec. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Zigiranyirazo Judgement]. Instigation was also
central to the prosecution of Moinina Fofana before the Special Court for Sierra
Leone. There, the Special Court found that Fofana’s speeches were too removed,
temporally and geographically, from the crimes in question to satisfy the
causality requirement of the crime of instigation, but that they did constitute
aiding and abetting the crimes in question, which does not require a causal
nexus. CDF Appeal Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, ¶¶ 52-55.
230
Id. ¶ 460.
231
Situation in Darfur, The Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05, Summary of
Prosecutor’s Application Under Article 58 (July 14, 2008) [hereinafter
Prosecutor’s Darfur Submission].
232
Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission
of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General (Jan. 25, 2005),
available at http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.
233
Id. ¶¶ 513-17. See generally Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of
Genocide, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1101 (2005) (critiquing methodology and
conclusions of Commission of Inquiry).
234
See Prosecutor’s Darfur Submission, Case No. ICC-02/05 ¶¶ 21-36, 45-60.
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the ICC declined to issue an arrest warrant for genocide,
concluding that the Prosecutor had not established reasonable
grounds to believe that al-Bashir committed genocide as required
by Article 58 of the ICC Statute.235
E. Forms of Liability
¶49

Although the law governing the substance of atrocity crimes
seems to be stabilizing, there is still considerable development with
respect to forms of responsibility available within ICL in light of
the collective nature of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
international and hybrid tribunals.236 In particular, the tribunals are
still experimenting with the full reach of the doctrines of joint
criminal enterprise (JCE), superior responsibility, and coperpetration.
1. Joint Criminal Enterprise

¶50

JCE in particular has proven to be an incredibly potent
doctrine. It enables particular individuals to be held liable not only
for crimes committed by others as part of common plan, but also
for the criminal acts of others that are the natural and foreseeable
result of the implementation of the common plan.237 The ICTY
235

Prosecutor v. al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009). Similarly, the closing order
against Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”) does not include genocide counts, although
the Co-Prosecutors originally indicated their intention to pursue such charges.
See Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 002/14-08-2006, Closing Order
Indicting Kaing Guek Eav Alia Duch (Aug. 8, 2008).
236
Martić Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ¶ 82 (noting that the
“crimes contemplated in the Statute mostly constitute the manifestations of
collective criminality and are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in
pursuance of a common criminal design or purpose”).
237
JCE is traditionally conceived of as encompassing three overlapping forms.
The first (“basic”) mode provides for liability where an individual intentionally
acts collectively with others to commit international crimes pursuant to a
common plan. The second (“systemic”) form provides for liability for
individuals who contribute to the maintenance or essential functions of a
criminal institution or system, such as a concentration or detention camp. The
third and most controversial form provides for extended liability, not only for
crimes intentionally committed pursuant to the common design, but also for
crimes that were the natural and foreseeable consequence of implementing the
common design. The theory with this latter form is that participants in the JCE
willingly took the risk of the commission of additional non-intentional but
foreseeable crimes. See generally Haradinaj Judgement, Case No. IT-04-84-T,
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Appeals Chamber has also held that members of a JCE can be held
liable for crimes committed by principal perpetrators who were not
members of the JCE but who were used by members of the JCE to
commit the crimes in question so long as the crime formed part of
the common purpose238 and a member of the JCE used the nonmembers in accordance with the common plan.239 Even where the
crimes committed by the non-JCE member are not part of the
common plan, such crimes still may be attributable to JCE
members where they are the natural and foreseeable consequence
of implementing the common plan and where the defendants
willingly took the risk that such crimes were a possible
consequence of the JCE.240 In order to convict a member of a JCE
for crimes committed by non-members of the JCE, a Trial
Chamber must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
commission of the crimes by non-members of the JCE formed part
of a common criminal purpose (first category of JCE), or of an
organized criminal system (second category of JCE), or were a
natural and foreseeable consequence of a common criminal
purpose (third category of JCE).241 Because of these expansive
interpretations of the JCE doctrine, it has emerged in recent years
as the darling in the ICTY Prosecutor’s nursery,242 largely
replacing superior responsibility as the primary theory of
responsibility for regime leaders and their followers.
¶51
A case from 2008 demonstrated, however, that the JCE
charge is not a silver bullet. The ICTY acquitted two of three
defendants in Haradinaj, which concerned crimes allegedly
committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).243 Although the
Trial Chamber concluded that KLA soldiers committed some (but
not all) of the acts of cruel treatment, torture, rape, and murder

¶¶ 135-39 (discussing elements of the JCE doctrine).
238
Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 410, 418 (Apr.
3, 2007).
239
Id. ¶¶ 413, 430.
240
Id. ¶¶ 413, 411.
241
Tadić Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 220.
242
Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) (coining the phrase
with respect to conspiracy).
243
Haradinaj Judgement, Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶¶ 502-04. This was the first
case before the ICTY in which the accused did not make any submissions or call
witnesses. Id. ¶ 6. Ramush Haradinaj resigned from his position as Prime
Minister of Kosovo to defend against the ICTY charges.
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alleged,244 the evidence was insufficient to infer the existence of a
common criminal objective among the accused and the other
participants in the alleged JCE.245 In particular, the Trial Chamber
determined that the Prosecution had presented little direct and
insufficient circumstantial evidence of the existence of a common
criminal objective connecting the defendants to the crimes
proven.246 The trial proceedings were marred by allegations of
witness tampering and intimidation. Many prosecution witnesses
refused to appear or to testify at trial, necessitating the extensive
use of witness protection measures, the issuance of subpoenas, and
the initiation of contempt proceedings.247 Some witnesses who
were expected to give probative testimony were never heard by the
Tribunal.248 The Prosecutor has appealed this verdict primarily on
the ground that given the prevailing circumstances of witness
intimidation and fear in Kosovo, the Prosecution was deprived of
its right to a fair trial when the Trial Chamber disallowed
additional time to secure the testimony of witnesses.249 The
Prosecutor has requested a retrial to present the testimony of the
absent witnesses.250
¶52
The availability and utility of the JCE doctrine before the
other tribunals remains in flux.251 In the ICTR context, because
most defendants have been charged with genocide, the Prosecutor
there has primarily relied upon charges of conspiracy to commit
genocide (defined as “an agreement between two or more persons to
commit genocide”252) rather than a JCE theory.253 One exception is
244

Id. ¶ 470.
Id. ¶ 475.
246
Id. ¶¶ 471, 475-78. The Trial Chamber held that to prove the existence of a
JCE on the basis of circumstantial evidence such as evidence of crimes
committed by KLA soldiers, the JCE must be “the only reasonable conclusion
on the evidence.” Id. ¶ 475.
247
Id. ¶¶ 6, 22-29.
248
Id. ¶ 28.
249
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-A, Prosecutor’s Notice of
Appeal, ¶¶ 3-5 (May 1, 2008).
250
Id. ¶ 7.
251
See Nahimana, Appeal Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-11-A, ¶ 478 (noting in
principle that the notion of commission covers not only the physical perpetration
of a crime, but also participation in a joint criminal enterprise).
252
Zigiranyirazo Judgement, Case No. ICTR-01-73-T, ¶ 389. Conspiracy to
commit genocide is an inchoate crime; it is completed once the agreement is
reached, regardless of whether the common objective is realized. Id. ¶ 389.
253
Genocide is the only crime for which the conspiracy theory of liability is
245
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the Zigiranyirazo case before the ICTR in which the Prosecutor
indicted the defendant, a businessman, for committing genocide
through a JCE (category one) and for conspiracy to commit
genocide.254 The Trial Chamber acquitted the defendant of the
conspiracy to commit genocide charge for lack of evidence that the
accused entered into an agreement with others to commit genocide.
Although the Trial Chamber acknowledged that the Prosecutor can
prove the existence of a conspiracy on indirect evidence, it also ruled
that the law requires that “the existence of the conspiracy … be the
only reasonable inference from the evidence.”255 The Trial Chamber
so ruled, even though it had established beyond a reasonable doubt
that there existed an Akazu, or Hutu power group, that included the
accused.256
¶53
By contrast, the Trial Chamber did convict the defendant for
participating in a JCE to commit genocide. It noted that the
massacre in question could only have been implemented with prior
planning and coordination, which gave rise to the inference that a
common criminal purpose existed.257 Given the circumstances—
the accused’s stature, his well-received speech, and his presence
while the massacre was underway—the Trial Chamber considered
it appropriate to infer that the accused shared the common purpose
to commit genocide.258 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber declined to
consider whether the accused could also be convicted of aiding and
abetting genocide.259 Finding no mitigating circumstances, the
accused was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment.260
¶54
Given the potency of the JCE theory of liability, it should
come as no surprise that its cognizability before the Extraordinary
available before the ad hoc tribunals in keeping with Article III of the Genocide
Convention. See ICTR Statute, supra note 29, art. 2(3)(b).
254
Zigiranyirazo Judgement, Case No. ICTR-01-73-T, ¶ 6.
255
Id. ¶ 394.
256
Id. ¶ 103.
257
Id. ¶ 407.
258
Id. ¶ 408. By contrast, with respect to another set of killings at a roadblock,
the Trial Chamber concluded that although the operation was organized, there
was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant was part of a JCE to kill
Tutsi individuals. Id. ¶ 418. On relatively weak reasoning, the Trial Chamber
convicted Zigiranyirazo of aiding and abetting the crimes committed at the
roadblock by virtue of the defendant’s instructions to check identity papers and
to feed the guards well, which the Trial Chamber considered to be sufficient
encouragement to constitute aiding or abetting genocide. Id. ¶¶ 420-24.
259
Id. ¶ 411.
260
Id. ¶ 468.
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Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has emerged as a
contentious issue. Kaing Guek Eav, alias “Duch,” is the first
individual to go to trial before the ECCC. Duch had been chief of
the infamous torture center Tuol Sleng (a.k.a. S-21). The CoProsecutors’ July 18, 2007 Initial Submission had requested that
Duch be indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity as
well as certain domestic crimes under the 1956 Penal Code—
which was never abrogated by the Khmer Rouge and which forms
part of the ECCC’s subject matter jurisdiction—pursuant to
principles of direct, accomplice, and superior liability, including by
participation in a JCE.261 The ECCC’s Co-Investigating Judges
indicted Duch in an August 8, 2008 Closing Order (which
concludes their investigation) for war crimes (grave breaches of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions including the unlawful confinement
of civilians and the mistreatment of prisoners of war) and crimes
against humanity (murder, torture, rape, extermination,
persecution, imprisonment, enslavement, and other inhumane
acts).262 The Co-Investigating Judges justified indicting Duch
solely for international crimes on the ground that his conduct
“must be accorded the highest available legal classification.”263 In
terms of the applicable forms of responsibility, Duch is alleged to
have committed, ordered, planned, instigated, aided, and abetted
the crimes in question.264 In addition, the Co-Investigating Judges
indicted him under the doctrine of superior responsibility by virtue
of the fact that he exercised effective command and control over
the staff of S-21.265 The Closing Order limits his “commission” of
crimes, however, to those incidents in which Duch “personally
tortured or mistreated detainees,”266 implicitly rejecting a theory of
JCE.
¶55
On August 21, 2008, the Co-Prosecutors appealed the
Closing Order to the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC), arguing that Duch
should also have been charged with the domestic crimes of murder
261

Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 002/14-08-2006/ECCC/OCP, Public
Information by the Co-Prosecutors Pursuant to Rule 54 Concerning Their Rule
66 Final Submission Regarding Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch” (July 18, 2008).
262
Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 002/14-08-2006, Closing Order
Indicting Kaing Guek Eav alia Duch (Aug. 8, 2008).
263
Id. ¶ 152.
264
Id. ¶¶ 153-56, 159-61.
265
Id. ¶¶ 157-58.
266
Id. ¶ 153.
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and torture and with the commission of all the charged crimes
pursuant to JCE.267 In support of their appeal, the Co-Prosecutors
argued that the Co-Investigating Judges have discretion with
respect to findings of fact, but only limited discretion to determine
the legal consequences of those facts.268 With respect to the
absence of charges for national crimes, the Co-Prosecutors argued
that the decision of the Co-Investigating Judges divests the
Prosecution of the ability to utilize cumulative charging—which is
generally allowed where crimes contain different material
elements—in situations in which it is unclear which crimes the
evidence will ultimately prove and in which it would be desirable
to fully account for the totality of an accused’s wrongdoing.269
With respect to the absence of reference to JCE, the CoProsecutors also argued that an accused has the right to know in
advance any theories of liability that will be pursued270 and that
JCE liability will “more completely capture the reality of the
commission of complex crimes involving numerous actors.”271
¶56
In light of the appeal, the ECCC requested former ICTY
Judge Antonio Cassese to submit an amicus curiae brief on the
evolution of the concept of the JCE as a mode of liability, with
particular reference to the period 1975-1979.272 Ieng Sary, a
higher-ranked defendant, also sought leave on September 15, 2008
to make submissions on the application of the JCE theory of
liability in the Duch case. In his request, Sary argued that “[t]he
application of JCE liability at the ECCC fundamentally affects Mr.
Ieng Sary because he is alleged to be part of the same ‘common
criminal plan’ as Duch. In these circumstances, Mr. Ieng Sary has
a clear interest in the outcome of the appeal and must be permitted
to make submissions on this appeal.”273 The PTC denied the right
267

Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, CoProsecutors’ Appeal of the Closing Order Against Kaing Guek Eav “Duch”
Dated August 8, 2008 (Sept. 5, 2008).
268
Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
269
Id. ¶¶ 21-23.
270
Id. ¶¶ 24-28.
271
Id. ¶ 48.
272
Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ,
Invitation to Amicus Curiae, ¶ 4 (Sept. 23, 2008).
273
Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Ieng
Sary’s Expedited Request to Make Submissions on the Application of Joint
Criminal Liability in the Co-Prosecutors’ Appeal of the Closing Order Against
Kaing Guek Eav “Duch”, ¶ 1 (Sept. 15, 2008). Sary also moved to disqualify the
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of intervention pursuant to the Court’s Internal Rules, which state
that only the Co-Prosecutors, the accused, and civil parties have a
right to be heard under these circumstances.274
¶57
The PTC ruled for the Co-Prosecutors on the question of the
national crimes,275 reasoning that domestic crimes are not fully
subsumed by the international crimes.276 Looking to the practice of
the other international criminal tribunals, the PTC determined that
cumulative charging is permissible under ICL.277 With respect to
the lack of reference to JCE liability in the Closing Order,
however, the PTC ruled that the proposed “S-21 JCE did not form
part of the factual basis” of the original investigation.278 The PTC
Cassese brief on the ground that it would be “result determinative” given that
Professor Cassese served on the appellate panel of the ICTY that rendered the
Tadić opinion. See Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 001/18-07-2007ECCC-OCIJ, Ieng Sary’s Motion to Disqualify Professor Antonio Cassese and
Selected Members of the Board of Editors and Editorial Committee of the
Journal of International Criminal Justice from Submitting a Written Amicus
Curiae Brief on the Issue of Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Co-Prosecutor’s
Appeal of the Closing Order Against Kaing Guek Eav “Duch” (Oct. 3, 2008).
The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the disqualification challenge for lack of
standing. Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ,
Decision on Ieng Sary’s Motion to Disqualify Amicus Curiae, ¶ 6 (Oct. 14,
2008). As Sary prophesied, the Cassese brief, which was filed on October 27,
2008, largely tracks the ICTY’s reasoning in the Tadić case. In particular, it
identifies a collection of cases from the post-World War II prosecutions that
were based on theories of common purpose or design and argues that these
doctrines had crystallized into customary international criminal law prior to
1975. In addition, the brief argues that JCE liability would have been
sufficiently established and assessable in domestic legislation and case law
(including from France and Cambodia) to provide adequate notice to the
accused in keeping with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. See Kaing
Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Amicus Curiae
Brief of Professor Antonio Cassese and Members of the Journal of International
Criminal Justice on Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine (Oct. 27, 2008).
274
Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Decision
on Ieng Sary’s Request to Make Submissions on the Application of the Theory
of Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Co-Prosecutor’s Appeal of the Closing Order
against Kaing Guek Eav “Duch”, ¶ 10 (Oct. 6, 2008).
275
Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Decision
on Appeal Against Closing Order Indicting Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch”, ¶ 107
(Dec. 5, 2008). In so ruling, the PTC also decided a question of first impression
regarding its standard of review of a Closing Order. It determined that “it is
empowered to decide independently on the legal characterization [of any
offenses] when deciding whether to include in the Closing Order the offences
and mode of liability requested by the Co-Prosecutors.” Id. ¶ 44.
276
Id. ¶¶ 72, 82-84.
277
Id. ¶ 87.
278
Id. ¶¶ 137-41.
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also described the Co-Prosecutors’ formulation of the S-21 JCE as
“vague” on the ground that they seemed to plead three different
forms of JCE.279 Given these framing deficiencies, the PTC thus
dodged the larger questions of whether the form of responsibility
was part of customary international law during the Khmer Rouge
era and thus whether it will be available as a theory of
responsibility before the ECCC if properly pled.280
2. Superior Responsibility
¶58

Given the difficulties of establishing some of the elements of
superior responsibility,281 and the utility of the doctrine of JCE,
prosecutors before the ICTY regularly charge JCE rather than
superior responsibility. Nonetheless, superior responsibility
remains a tool in the prosecutors’ toolbox. The most compelling
279

Id. ¶ 135.
Id. ¶ 142. The ECCC Law does not specifically mention the availability of
JCE as a form of commission, but the ICTY in the landmark Tadić decision
treated JCE as a prosecutable form of “commission,” even though its Statute is
also silent as to this form of responsibility and excludes conspiracy except with
respect to the crime of genocide. Tadić Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
¶¶ 187-220. Although the Tadić indictment did not specifically allege joint
criminal enterprise liability, the theory was allowed on appeal. Nowadays, when
the Prosecutor intends to rely on joint criminal enterprise, it must specifically
plead this mode of liability in the indictment. Bikindi Judgement, Case No.
ICTR-01-72-T, ¶ 398 (citing Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-A,
Judgement, ¶ 22 (Nov. 26, 2006) (“[W]hen the Prosecution charges the
‘commission’ of one of the crimes . . . , it must specify whether the said term is
to be understood as meaning physical commission by the accused or
participation in a joint criminal enterprise, or both. It is not enough for the
generic language of an indictment to ‘encompass’ the possibility that joint
criminal enterprise is being charged. The Appeals Chamber reiterates that joint
criminal enterprise must be specifically pleaded in an indictment. . . . [I]t is
insufficient for an indictment to merely make broad reference to Article 7(1) . . .
; such reference does not provide sufficient notice to the Defence or to the Trial
Chamber that the Prosecution is intending to rely on joint criminal enterprise
responsibility.”)).
281
Compare CDF Appeal Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A ¶¶ 174-89
(confirming conviction of Kondewa on grounds that he exercised de facto
effective control over Kamajor commanders, even though he was a civilian) with
¶¶ 212-16 (finding there was insufficient evidence of a relationship of
subordination with respect to other commanders). In so ruling, the Appeals
Chamber confirmed that the test for establishing the existence of a superiorsubordinate relationship is largely the same for both military and civilian
superiors. Id. ¶ 175. See generally Beth Van Schaack, Command Responsibility:
An Anatomy of Proof in Romagoza v. Garcia, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213
(2003) (discussing challenges of proving superior responsibility).
280
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jurisprudence of 2008 with regard to the doctrine of superior
responsibility appears in separate opinions in Orić.282 In that case,
the Trial Chamber indicated that, although it would have ruled
differently had the issue been one of first impression, it felt bound
by prior precedent in Hadžihasanović283 to disallow arguments by
the prosecution that the defendant—Naser Orić, Bosniak
commander of the Joint Armed Forces around Srebrenica—could
be prosecuted and convicted for failing to punish police
subordinates whose crimes were committed prior to the creation of
a superior-subordinate relationship involving the accused.284 The
Tribunal in Hadžihasanović had also somewhat reluctantly held285
that a superior could only be held liable for crimes committed
while the superior-subordinate relationship was in place.286 In
particular, the Appeals Chamber determined that there was no
customary international law basis to hold a superior liable for the
crimes of his or her subordinates when such crimes are committed
prior to the superior assuming his or her position of command.287
Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen issued a strong dissent in

282
Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Judgement (July 3, 2008)
[hereinafter Orić Appeal Judgement]. The Trial Chamber originally convicted
Orić for failing to prevent subordinates under his command from mistreating
Bosnian Serb prisoners and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment.
Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 490, 565-72, 578 (June
30, 2006) [hereinafter Orić Trial Judgement]. This resulted in his immediate
release for time served. On the Prosecutor’s appeal, the Appeals Chamber
actually reversed the conviction. Orić Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-03-68-A,
¶ 180.
283
Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command
Responsibility (July 16, 2003) [hereinafter Hadžihasanović Interlocutory
Appeal]. See also Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T,
Judgement (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Hadžihasanović Trial Judgement]. The
Trial Chamber convicted Enver Hadžihasanović and his co-accused Amir
Kubera, two Bosniak commanders, for crimes committed by subordinates
(murder, cruel treatment, and plunder). On cross-appeals, the Appeals Chamber
vacated some convictions and reduced the defendants’ sentences. Prosecutor v.
Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Judgement, ¶ 356-58 (Apr. 22, 2008).
284
Orić Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-03-68-T, ¶ 335 (noting that “for a
superior’s duty to punish, it should be immaterial whether he or she had
assumed control over the relevant subordinates prior to their committing the
crime.”). See also id. ¶¶ 574-75.
285
Hadžihasanović Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-01-47-T, ¶ 199.
286
Hadžihasanović Interlocutory Appeal, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, ¶ 51.
287
Id. ¶ 45.
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Hadžihasanović.288 In Orić, he restyled his dissent as a
declaration289 and was joined by Judges Liu Daqun290 and
Wolfgang Schomberg in dissent291 in strongly urging the Tribunal
to overrule its prior decision in Hadžihasanović. Nonetheless,
without a majority of judges willing to formally dissent, the
Appeals Chamber in Orić declined to even reconsider the ratio
decidendi of Hadžihasanović, despite briefing by the parties.292
¶59
The Orić detractors took issue with the Appeals Chamber’s
inaction, noting the duty of the Appeals Chamber to correct the law
and to address matters of general importance to the Tribunals’
jurisprudence and to international criminal law,293 even if such
matters would not be outcome determinative294 and especially
where the issue is one that has proved to be contentious in
subsequent cases.295 They also criticized the reasoning used and
sources relied upon by the Tribunal296 in Hadžihasanović to
288
Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Dissent by Judge
Shahabuddeen (July 16, 2003).
289
Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Declaration of Judge
Shahabuddeen (July 3, 2008) [hereinafter Shahabuddeen Orić Declaration].
Judge Shahabuddeen explained his issuance of a declaration rather than a dissent
on the ground that he did not feel that a judge in the dissenting minority in
Hadžihasanović should form part of a reversing majority in Orić. Id. ¶ 15.
290
Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Partially Dissenting Opinion and
Declaration of Judge Liu (July 3, 2008) [hereinafter Liu Orić Dissent].
291
Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Separate and Partially Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Schomburg (July 3, 2008) [hereinafter Schomburg Orić
Dissent].
292
Orić Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-03-68-A, ¶ 167.
293
Schomburg Orić Dissent, Case No. IT-03-68-A, ¶ 32 (noting the importance
of correcting the law). See also Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A,
Decision on Motion to Dismiss Ground 1 of the Prosecutor’s Appeal (May 5,
2005) (noting that such determinations “do not constitute impermissible
‘advisory opinions,’ but are instead necessary means of moving forward this ad
hoc international tribunal’s jurisprudence within the limited time in which it
operates and contributing meaningfully to the overall development of
international criminal law”).
294
Liu Orić Dissent, Case No. IT-03-68-A, ¶¶ 3-4; Schomburg Orić Dissent,
Case No. IT-03-68-A, ¶ 27 (noting that a decision on the issue would not affect
the liability of the particular accused, such that overturning a prior precedent
would work no unfairness).
295
Liu Orić Dissent, Case No. IT-03-68-A, ¶ 8; Schomburg Orić Dissent, Case
No. IT-03-68-A, ¶ 4 (noting that a number of judges have expressed
disagreement with Hadžihasanović).
296
Liu Orić Dissent, Case No. IT-03-68-A, ¶¶ 14-21 (critiquing the prior
interpretation Protocol I’s formulation of command responsibility as inconsistent
with the plain text of the relevant provisions).
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conclude that there was no customary law basis to hold a successor
liable for failing to punish the crimes committed by his
subordinates when they were under the command of his
predecessor. Finally, they noted that the object and purpose of IHL
are undermined by the hole in the doctrine created by the prior
opinion.297
¶60
Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, and indeed all formulations
of the superior responsibility doctrine, make clear that the duty to
prevent and the duty to punish are two separate but inter-related
duties and that liability may attach with respect to either.298 The
two are not unrelated, however, because rigorously punishing past
bad acts by subordinates will contribute to the prevention of future
crimes. Enabling a newcomer to be prosecuted for failing to punish
known bad acts committed prior to his assumption of the position
as a superior will ensure that the superior responsibility doctrine
accomplishes what it is meant to accomplish—the creation of
strong legal incentives to rigorously investigate and—where
appropriate—prosecute crimes committed by subordinates.299
Ensuring the predictability of investigation and punishment will
prevent a culture of impunity from taking root within an armed
force. This, in turn, will go far toward preventing the commission
of abuses in the first place.
¶61
There is no strong tradition of stare decisis in international
300
law, but the international criminal tribunals have acknowledged
the importance of stability and predictability in the law. Before the
ICTY, the Appeals Chamber has indicated that it can depart from a
prior decision for only “cogent reasons.”301 This is one instance in
which the ICTY should invoke that power. The Hadžihasanović
297

Schomburg Orić Dissent, Case No. IT-03-68-A, ¶¶ 16-17.
Orić Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-03-68-T, ¶ 335 (noting the “cohesive
interlinking of preventing and punishing” in the doctrine); Liu Dissent, Case No.
IT-03-68-A, ¶ 29.
299
Liu Orić Dissent, Case No. IT-03-68-A, ¶ 30 (noting that the purpose of the
command responsibility doctrine is to ensure compliance with IHL and that the
majority’s view “to a certain extent defeats this objective”). See also id. ¶ 31
(“When a commander assumes his duties, he does not only take over the rights
and privileges of his predecessor, but also his duties and obligations.”).
300
Indeed, the ICJ specifically disclaims any precedential value of its prior
decisions. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, pt. 2, 1055, 1060.
301
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 107, 110,
111, 125 (Mar. 24, 2000).
298
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decision is wrong as a matter of law, flawed as a matter of logic,
and counter-productive as a matter of policy. It has been criticized
by subsequent panels302 and in the literature,303 is demonstrably
erroneous, and produces arbitrary results. In short, it manifests all
of the grounds recognized by courts all over the world for
overturning prior precedent, notwithstanding the imperatives of
predictability and stability guaranteed by stare decisis.
3. Co-Perpetration
¶62

Although JCE has to a certain extent been applied in the
other ad hoc tribunals, it remains unclear to what extent the
ICTY’s JCE jurisprudence will influence the ICC. The JCE
doctrine per se is not specifically enumerated within the Statute of
the ICC, largely because the law in this area was still under
development by the ICTY at the time the ICC Statute was
finalized. The ICC Statute does contain reference to the common
purpose doctrine,304 with language drawn from Article 2(3)(c) of
the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,305 one
of the sources relied on the Tadić appeal to support the existence of
the JCE doctrine. Nonetheless, the ICC Prosecutor has to date
primarily charged defendants pursuant to the doctrine of coperpetration as set forth in Article 25(3)(a),306 rather than pursuant
to the common purpose doctrine.307
302

Schomburg Orić Dissent, Case No. IT-03-68-A, ¶ 27 (noting that
Hadžihasanović was decided by a slim majority, was criticized in subsequent
cases, and remains disputed—all grounds suggesting that “the threshold for
overcoming the principle of stare decisis . . . is not as high as it would be vis-àvis a unanimously adopted interpretation of the law.”).
303
See Carol T. Fox, Closing a Loophole in Accountability for War Crimes:
Successor Commanders’ Duty to Punish Known Past Offenses, 55 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 443 (2004).
304
In particular, the provision states that someone can be criminally liable if she:
In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a
crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be
intentional and shall either:
Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or
Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.
ICC Statute, supra note 31, art. 25(3)(d).

305
306

U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/164 (Jan. 9, 1998).
This Article provides:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable
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For example, the Katanga & Chui case involving crimes
committed by allied members of the Force de Résistance
Patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI—Katanga’s organization) and the
Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationistes (FNI—Chui’s
organization) in the DRC village of Bogoro. The Prosecutor
charged the defendants with “criminal responsibility as a coperpetrator of a common plan”308 and, in the alternative, with
ordering the offences charged pursuant to Article 25(3)(b).309
According to the co-perpetrator doctrine, the principals involved in
a crime are not limited to those who physically carry out the
objective elements of the offence, but also include those who
control or mastermind its commission because they decide whether
and how the offense will be committed, even if they are removed
from the scene of the crime.310 This approach encompasses three
categories of principal:

for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: (a) Commits
such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person,
regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible.
ICC Statute, supra note 31, art. 25(3)(a).

307
This concept has been invoked before the ICTY, although the Appeals
Chamber ultimately decided that the doctrine did not constitute part of
customary international law. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T,
Judgement, ¶ 741 (July 31, 2003) (identifying the accused as a co-perpetrator
where he was the perpetrator behind the direct perpetrator); Prosecutor v. Stakić,
Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement, ¶ 62 (Mar. 22, 2006) (reversing the Trial
Chamber by noting that co-perpetratorship “does not have support in customary
international law or in the settled jurisprudence of this Tribunal, which is
binding on the Trial Chambers” in contradistinction to the joint criminal
enterprise doctrine, which is well established). The ICC rejected this approach in
Katanga & Chui, on the ground that Article 21 of the ICC Statute directs the
Court to consider its own Statute, first and foremost, as a source of law, so that
whether or not the contested mode of liability forms part of customary
international law is of no moment. Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 508 (Sept.
30, 2008) [hereinafter Katanga & Chui Decision on Confirmation of Charges].
The PTC noted, “[t]his is a good example of the need not to transfer the ad hoc
tribunals’ case law mechanically to the system of the Court.” Id.
308
Id. ¶ 469.
309
Id. ¶ 470. Article 25(3)(b) allows for jurisdiction over anyone who “[o]rders,
solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted.”
310
Id. ¶ 485. See generally Kai Ambos, Article 25: Individual Criminal
Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 743, 743-770 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008).
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a. The individual who physically carries out all
elements of the offense (commission of the
crime as an individual);
b. The individual who has, together with
others, control over the offence by reason of
the essential tasks assigned to him
(commission of the crime jointly with
others);
c. The individual who has control over the will
of those who carry out the objective
elements of the offence (commission of the
crime through another person).311
In the confirmation decision, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (“PTC”)
treated this form of liability as an alternative to the doctrine of
superior responsibility: “through a combination of individual
responsibility for committing crimes through other persons
together with the mutual attribution among the co-perpetrators at
the senior level, a mode of liability arises which allows the Court
to assess the blameworthiness of ‘senior leaders’ adequately.”312 It
also analogized the idea of committing a crime through another
with the domestic law concept of “perpetrator-by-means” whereby
the defendant uses the direct perpetrator as a tool or instrument for
the commission of the crime.313 Under this doctrine, although both
individuals may ultimately be jointly liable for the crimes, one is
deemed the “perpetrator behind the perpetrator.”314 This doctrine is
also useful in situations in which the defendant controls an
organization or “organized apparatus of power”315 that has been
used to commit crimes. Under these circumstances, the PTC noted
that the organization in question

311

Katanga & Chui Decision on Confirmation of Charges, Case No. ICC-01/0401/07-717, ¶ 488.
312
Id. ¶ 492.
313
Id. ¶ 495. Typically under domestic law, the direct perpetrator is not fully
criminally responsible for his actions, either because he acted under duress,
suffered from a mistake of fact, or is not capable of blameworthiness because of
youth or incapacitation. Id. ¶ 495.
314
Id. ¶ 496.
315
Id. ¶ 511.
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must be based on hierarchical relations between
superiors and subordinates. The organisation must
also be composed of sufficient subordinates to
guarantee that superiors’ orders will be carried out,
if not by one subordinate, then by another. These
criteria ensure that orders given by the recognised
leadership will generally be complied with by their
subordinates.316
Indeed, “[t]he main attribute of this kind of organisation is a
mechanism that enables its highest authorities to ensure automatic
compliance with their orders.”317 The PTC noted that such
organizations are often formed by virtue of subjecting their
members to intensive and violent training regimens.318
¶64
In all these cases, the defendant is treated as a principal rather
than as an accessory,319 precisely because the leader can secure
automatic compliance with his orders. This is compared with
charges brought under Article 25(3)(b) (for ordering crimes
simpliciter), whereby the defendant is considered a mere accessory
to the crime committed by the subordinate.320 Thus, criminal
actions of subordinates can be attributed to their leaders.321 As will
be relevant in the Katanga & Chui case, criminal liability can be
ascribed across organizations and leaders on the basis of “mutual
attribution.”322
¶65
In addition to this element of control, the doctrine of coperpetration also requires proof that there is a common plan or
agreement to carry out the elements of the crime through other
316

Id. ¶ 512.
Id. ¶ 517.
318
Id. ¶ 518.
319
Id. ¶ 504. The distinction between perpetrators and accomplices may have
little practical effect in common law jurisdictions at sentencing. By contrast, in
some civil law jurisdictions, accomplices may by law receive shorter sentences.
For example, under Dutch law, principals include “[t]hose who commit a
criminal offense, either personally or jointly with another or others, or who
cause an innocent person to commit a criminal offense.” Pen. Code. § 47(1.1)
(Neth). Accessories are those “who intentionally assist during the commission of
the serious offense.” Id. § 48. Punishment for accessories is one-third that of
principals, id. §49.1, and in no case shall exceed 15 years, id. §49.2.
320
Katanga & Chui Decision on Confirmation of Charges, Case No. ICC-01/0401/07-717, ¶ 517.
321
Id. ¶ 519.
322
Id. ¶ 520.
317
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individuals323 and that the defendant exercised joint control over
the crime as a result of her dual ability to make an “essential
contribution to it” and to frustrate the commission of the crime by
not performing her tasks.324 In terms of the required mental
element, the doctrine of co-perpetration requires a showing that
Both suspects: (a) are mutually aware that
implementing their common plan will result in the
realisation of the objective elements of the crime;
(b) undertake such activities with the specific intent
to bring about the objective elements of the crime,
or are aware that the realisation of the objective
elements will be a consequence of their acts in the
ordinary course of events.325
In addition, with respect to perpetration through another, it must be
shown that the defendant was aware of the factual circumstances
enabling him to exercise control of the crime through the other
person, i.e., that he played an essential role in the implementation
of the plan and that he could frustrate the plan by withholding his
contribution.326
¶66
Turning to the evidence in the record to date, the ICC PTC
confirmed that there was sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe that the defendants exercised control
over groups whose members, including child soldiers, would
automatically comply with their orders,327 that they agreed upon a
common plan to wipe out the village,328 and that they each played
essential roles in implementing the plan.329 In addition, it was
sufficiently established that the defendants intended the village to
be wiped out and knew that their orders would be automatically
complied with.330

323

Id. ¶ 522.
Id. ¶ 525.
325
Id. ¶ 533.
326
Id. ¶¶ 534, 538-39.
327
Id. ¶¶ 546-47.
328
Id. ¶ 548.
329
Id. ¶ 555.
330
Id. ¶¶ 562-63.
324
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4. Conspiracy
¶67

In the long-anticipated Military I judgment, the ICTR
illustrated the stringent standard of proof required to convict
defendants of conspiracy on the basis of circumstantial evidence.331
Théoneste Bagasora held the position of directeur du cabinet in
Rwanda’s Ministry of Defense and was widely believed to have
been a major architect of the genocide in Rwanda. He and three
other military commanders were prosecuted together for genocide,
conspiracy and complicity to commit genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes including the killing of the Rwandan
Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and ten Belgian
peacekeepers.332 The trial consumed 408 days over six years and
involved the testimony of 242 witnesses.
¶68
Conspiracy to commit genocide requires “an agreement
between two or more persons to commit the crime of genocide.”333
The crime of conspiracy to commit genocide consists of the actus
reus—an agreement between the two or more people—and the
mens rea for genocide—“the intent to destroy in whole or in part a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.”334
Circumstantial evidence (such as evidence of concerted and
coordinated action among individuals) can prove the existence of a
conspiracy,335 but a finding of conspiracy on the basis of
circumstantial proof must be the “only reasonable inference based
on the totality of the evidence.”336 The Trial Chamber noted that
331

Prosecutor v. Bagasora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (Dec. 18, 2008)
[hereinafter Bagosora Judgement].
332
Id. ¶ 2002. The Prosecutor also charged Nsengiyumva, one of Bagasora’s codefendants, with incitement to commit genocide. Witnesses for the defendant
argued that he preached peace at a series of meetings. The Prosecutor argued
that this was a tactic to create a false sense of security among the Tutsi
population and appease the international community. The prosecution, however,
was unable to prove this theory sufficiently. Id. ¶¶ 1258-85.
333
Id. ¶ 2087. The Trial Chamber noted that in the eight cases concerning
allegations of a conspiracy to commit genocide, only three cases resulted in a
conviction for the crime: one pursuant to a guilty plea (Kambanda), one
concerning a specific attack (Niyitegeka) and one concerning the RTLM that
was overturned on appeal. See id. ¶ 2089.
334
Id. ¶ 2087.
335
“The qualifiers ‘concerted or coordinated’ are important: it is not sufficient to
simply show similarity of conduct.” Id. ¶ 2088 (citing Nahimana Appeal
Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-11-A, ¶¶ 896-97).
336
Id. ¶ 2088 (citing Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A,
Judgement, ¶ 221 (Mar. 12, 2008); Nahimana Appeal Judgement, Case No.
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there was no requirement that all of the accused conspired
together; rather, it is sufficient that each accused conspired with at
least one other.337
¶69
The question of the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction also
became central to the case, because the Prosecution argued that the
conspiracy to commit genocide was already in existence prior to
April 7, 1994, the day after the assassination of Juvénal
Habyarimana and the official start of the genocide.338 The
Prosecutor put on evidence of events taking place between 1990
through 1994 that in his estimation evidenced a “growing and
developing preparedness” forming links “in a chain of
conspiracy.”339 The Trial Chamber observed, however, that expert
witnesses had varying views on the start date of the planning of the
conspiracy, with some testifying that the conspiracy began in 1990
and others testifying that the genocide was first “spark[ed]” by the
downing of Habyarimana’s plane on April 6.340
¶70
The Prosecution adduced seven categories of circumstantial
evidence to prove the existence of an extant conspiracy to commit
genocide: (1) the convening of an “enemy commission” that
identified Tutsi individuals as the enemy; (2) statements by
Bagasora concerning the impending “apocalypse;” (3) meetings
before April 6, 1994 between local military commanders; (4) the
preparation and use of lists of Tutsi names; (5) the creation,
arming, and training of civilian militias; (6) information from an
informant (“Jean-Pierre”) about a “Machiavellian Plan;” and (7)
the defendants’ involvement in clandestine Hutu Power
organizations.341 The Trial Chamber found, however, that the
evidence was insufficient with respect to each of these elements to
conclude that the only reasonable conclusion was that the
defendants were involved in a conspiracy to commit genocide.
Indeed, the Trial Chamber concluded that much of this evidence is
also consistent with preparations for a political or military power
struggle.342 Three of the defendants were convicted of direct and
ICTR-96-11-A, ¶ 896).
337
Id. ¶ 2096.
338
See id. ¶¶ 2091, 2093, 2094.
339
Id. ¶ 2094.
340
Bagasora Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, ¶ 2095.
341
Id. ¶¶ 2098-2104.
342
Id. ¶ 2110.
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superior responsibility for international crimes;343 Kabiligi was
acquitted, largely on the strength of his alibi defense.344
5. Chains of Liability
¶71

The jurisprudence of the international tribunals confirms that
multiple modes of participation may be relevant to a particular
crime base. The ICTY in particular has shown a willingness to
parse the facts between the three forms of JCE liability.345 In
addition, ICL cases are increasingly premised on layered theories
of responsibility, where particular defendants are prosecuted for
events that have been committed by individuals several steps
removed from the defendants’ immediate fields of operation. So,
we can now contemplate situations in which there is a joint
criminal enterprise involving the defendant that develops a
common purpose to commit certain crimes. Other members of the
JCE use individuals outside the JCE to provide knowing and
substantial support to still other individuals who commit crimes
that were not within the original common purpose of the JCE, but
were the natural and foreseeable consequence of implementing the
JCE—including, potentially, genocide.346 Or, it should be possible
to pursue a case involving a defendant who is charged pursuant to
superior responsibility for acts of complicity committed by
subordinates under her effective command.347 This chain of
liability is possible at a theoretical doctrinal level, but providing
adequate proof of each relationship of derivative or secondary
liability along this daisy chain can be exceedingly difficult. Where
the prosecutor has not sufficiently established each and every link
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Id. ¶ 2258.
Id. ¶¶ 1969-86.
345
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement ¶¶ 435-55 (June 12,
2007) (convicting defendant of some crimes pursuant to a basic JCE and other
crimes as foreseeable under the extended form of JCE).
346
See Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the
Crime of Genocide, ¶ 31 (Oct. 22, 2004) (recognizing applicability of joint
criminal enterprise liability to the crime of genocide).
347
See Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, ¶ 404 (July 10, 2008)
(noting that superior responsibility “encompasses all forms of criminal conduct
by subordinates, not only the ‘committing’ of crimes in the restricted sense of
the term, but also all other modes of participation in crimes envisaged under
Article 7(1) of the Statute”).
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in the chain of liability, the notion of personal liability becomes too
attenuated.
III. CONCLUSION
¶72

Unless the international community creates more ad hoc or
hybrid courts, international prosecutions will increasingly proceed
exclusively before the ICC.348 Although the ICC Statute and its
assistive Elements of Crimes349 more closely mirror the precision
expected of domestic penal codes, there are legality deficits within
the Court’s statutory framework that may invite or necessitate
judicial innovation, notwithstanding more robust nullum crimen
sine lege (“no crime without law”) provisions that not only prohibit
the retroactive application of law but also mandate strict
construction in favor of the defendant. 350 The ICC has yet to issue
many substantive opinions, although its decisions confirming the
charges against the accused do provide some insights into how the
ICC will approach its subject matter. Nonetheless, these debut
rulings already reveal that while the personnel of the ICC are
348
In addition, the ECCC will have to determine the state of ICL in the 1975-79
period, when the Khmer Rouge were in power and when many of the most
relevant developments in the law of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide were in flux See ECCC Statute, supra note 30, art. 2 (limiting the
ECCC’s temporal jurisdiction to crimes committed during the period of April
17, 1975 to January 6, 1979).
349
Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Addendum: Finalized
Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2
(Nov.
2,
2000),
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/prepcomm/jun2000/5thdocs.htm
(follow
“Addendum: Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes” hyperlinks). See
David Hunt, The International Criminal Court: High Hopes,“Creative
Ambiguity” and an Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 56, 60 (2004) (opining that the Elements of Crime—“an
overwhelming exercise of legal positivism”—will have the effect of “stultifying
further growth in the law”).
350
Article 22(1) of the ICC Statute dictates that “[a] person shall not be
criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court.” Article 24(2) provides that “[i]n the event of a change in the law
applicable to a given case prior to a final judgement, the law more favourable to
the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.” Likewise,
the principle of strict construction and the rule of lenity are specifically
mandated at Article 22(2), which states: “The definition of a crime shall be
strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity,
the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated,
prosecuted or convicted.” ICC Statute, supra note 31.
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clearly influenced by their brethren at the ad hoc tribunals, they are
by no means engaging in a mechanical borrowing of established
doctrines. Instead, the world’s first permanent international court is
beginning to chart its own course. As the ICC increasingly issues
substantive rulings, these developments will no doubt feature
prominently in future atrocity crimes litigation reviews.

